

# Twenty-fifth session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

Summary for policy-makers



**COP25**  
**CHILE**  
**MADRID 2019**  
UN CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCE



Madrid, Spain  
December 2019



Twenty-fifth session of the Conference  
of the Parties to the United Nations  
Framework Convention on Climate Change

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# A few words from the Director of the IFDD - Climate Guide COP 25

Policymakers and Delegates,

When adopting the Paris Agreement in 2015, the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) had mandated the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to produce a special report on the consequences of global warming of the planet above 1.5 degrees Celsius.

The IPCC report published in 2018 reveals that limiting warming to 1.5°C rather than 2°C would lead to a more sustainable and more equitable society. It nevertheless underlines that it would require rapid, far-reaching and unprecedented changes in all aspects of society to achieve this. This means in particular reducing greenhouse gas emissions considerably as quickly as possible and establishing low-carbon economies.

Action by the international community in combating climate change, that falls under the implementation of the Paris Agreement, must take the conclusions of the IPCC report into account. It is therefore important to convert the national commitments contained in the nationally-determined contributions into programmes and projects on the ground. It urges an upwards revision of the emissions reduction ambition, taking account of national priorities and circumstances.

Last September, the UN Secretary General, António Guterres, showed the way by inviting world leaders to attend a Summit in New York, USA, devoted to action to combat climate change. A total of 77 countries committed to total elimination of their greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. Several financial undertakings totalling USD7.4 billion were announced for the Green Climate Fund. In addition, several countries planned to withdraw gradually from using coal.

The theme of the Summit convened by the UN Secretary General was: *“A race we can win. A race we must win”*. This theme points to the need to act urgently against climate change, as actions taken too late will not save mankind.

The effects of global warming of 1°C are already very real, as confirmed by the increase in extreme weather events, rising sea levels and the shrinking Arctic ice pack.

The 25th session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP25), scheduled for 2-13 December in Madrid, Spain under the Presidency of Chile, will be the ideal framework for the international community to encourage an increase in the ambition of nationally-determined contributions. Policymakers and negotiators from around the globe, including those from the French-speaking countries, will discuss this matter and others no less important, mainly the mobilisation of long-term financing, cooperation mechanisms

under the Paris Agreement, the follow-up to the IPCC Special Report on the 1.5 degrees, capacity-building under the Paris Agreement, consideration of specific needs and the special situation of certain Parties, etc. Seemingly, COP25 should achieve outcomes matching the urgency of climate action, especially more ambitious commitments by the countries before 2020.

To facilitate your work as French-speaking negotiators and policymakers, IFDD has produced this Guide to the Negotiations and its Summary for Policymakers. This tool written by ENERGIES 2050 on behalf of IFDD summarises the previous Conferences of the Parties, provides information on the items on the COP25 agenda and deciphers the main issues. I hope you will find this Guide very useful during the negotiations. In addition to this tool, you are invited to take part in a preparatory workshop for negotiators which will be held on 1 December 2019, in Madrid, Spain, during which the Guide will be presented.

I trust that you enjoy reading the Guide to the Negotiations and wish you every success in your work at COP 25.

Jean-Pierre Ndoutoum

# Editorial

This *Summary for Policymakers* accompanies the *Guide to the Negotiations* produced every year by IFDD as support for the sessions of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). These two documents benefit from inputs from a group of authors and contributors from different French-speaking countries who have been involved on a daily basis in the climate negotiations for many years. A Review Committee comprising personalities selected for their expertise has also been set up to ensure that the information provided to readers is relevant, accurate and useful.

The format of the Summary has been streamlined compared with previous editions. The aim is to offer every individual – negotiator or representative of the academic world, public or private organisations, civil society organisations or international institutions – quick and simple access to the information he needs to comprehend the negotiations, based on his own priorities. A wealth of illustrations, boxes and summary tables are included to help in understanding the issues addressed as much as possible.

The authors have striven to propose a global and analytical presentation of issues for each section along with the main outlook for COP25. Note that only the official nomenclatures are quoted when reference is made to the documents from the negotiations. All information provided is up-to-date as at 23 October 2019.

## ***Presentation of the contents of the Summary for Policymakers***

Each Part of the Summary for Policymakers deals with a specific topic:

- Part I puts the current main issues of the negotiations into perspective. It focuses especially on the climate package adopted by the Parties at Katowice in December 2018 relating to the operationalisation rules of the Paris Agreement. The structure of the UNFCCC and its different bodies is also presented.
- Part II introduces the major issues on the agenda for the negotiations of the 25th Conference of the Parties (COP25).
- Part II covers the operationalisation of cooperation mechanisms provided for under Articles 6.2, 6.4 and 6.8 of the Paris Agreement, that are at the heart of the COP25 negotiations.
- The next sections relate to the central issues associated with the nationally-determined contributions (NDC) and the mitigation (Part IV), adaptation (Part V) and financing (Part VI) goals.

- The other topics on the negotiations agenda are then addressed, covering mainly the modalities, procedures and guidelines for the enhanced transparency framework (Part VII), the issues of support for building up capacity (Part VIII) and technology (IX) along with the specific themes of loss and damage (X), gender and gender equality (XI) and agriculture (XII).
- Lastly, Part XIII recalls that combating climate change is a collective responsibility and commitment. As such, the involvement of non-Party entities in the negotiations, the results of the Talanoa Dialogue and progress of the Marrakesh Partnership are underlined.



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# I. Progress of negotiations since COP24

## I.1. Brief history of the negotiations

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted during the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992<sup>1</sup> and entered into force in 1994. Its goal is to *prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system*. The Parties to UNFCCC are split into three distinctive groups on the basis of the principle of *common but differentiated responsibilities: Annex I* (41 Parties, uniting the developed countries and those with economies in transition<sup>2</sup>) which have to submit regular greenhouse gas emission (GHG) inventories, *Annex II* (24 Parties included in Annex I, excluding countries with economies in transition) which have to support the developing countries with financial resources<sup>3</sup> and the *Parties not included in Annex I*, basically the developing countries.

### **Kyoto Protocol (KP)**

The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in December 1997 at the end of the third Conference of the Parties (COP3) and its operationalisation modalities were established within the Marrakesh Accords in 2001 (COP7)<sup>4</sup>. It effectively entered into force on 16 February 2005<sup>5</sup>. The developed country Parties to the KP included in Annex B undertake during this period to reduce collectively their GHG emissions by at least 5 % compared with 1990 for an initial commitment period from 2008 to 2012. These countries can use market mechanisms to achieve their emission goals. COP13 (2007) subsequently saw the adoption of a road map, the Bali Action Plan, with the target by 2009 of agreeing on a post-2012 climate regime under the Convention.

- 
1. UNFCCC, 1992 Text of the Convention accessible [online] <https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf>
  2. UNFCCC, 1992
  3. Originally 25, but Turkey was deleted from Annex II by an amendment that entered into force on 28 June 2002, in accordance with Decision 26/CP.7
  4. See Decision 1/CP.7
  5. See [online] <https://unfccc.int/process/the-kyoto-protocol/status-of-ratification>

No detailed agreement on the post-2012 regime going beyond the Kyoto Protocol could be reached at COP15 held in Copenhagen in December 2009<sup>6</sup>. It was not until COP18 in Doha (Qatar, 2012) that the Parties agreed on an amendment to the KP providing for GHG reduction targets during a second commitment period from 2013 to 2020<sup>7</sup>, with a rise in ambition focused on two main points: (i) a commitment by Parties to reduce their emissions by 18% compared with 1990 and (ii) a broader composition of Parties targeted by these quantified goals<sup>8</sup>. As at 23 October 2019, 134 Parties have ratified this amendment, which remains below the threshold for entry into force set at 144 ratifications<sup>9</sup>. In addition, a significant proportion of Annex B countries have made known their failure to reach the targets for the second commitment period. For this reason, the negotiations on a new long-term regime under the UNFCCC were intensified from 2012 onwards.

## Paris Agreement

COP21 held in Paris in 2015 ended by adopting a new “universal” regime on climate change under the UNFCCC. Unlike the PK (which remains officially in force), the Paris Agreement is based on self-determined commitments of each member State (nationally-determined contributions, NDC) that take its national circumstances into account. Its long-term objective is to *limit warming well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels* whilst *pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C*<sup>10</sup>. It is targeting for this a regular enhancement of NDC in order to *reach a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and anthropogenic removals by sinks of GHG in the course of the second half of the century*.

The work to operationalise the Paris Agreement and its application is split between the permanent subsidiary bodies (SBI and SBSTA) and the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA), an *ad hoc* negotiating body<sup>11</sup>. The Paris Agreement effectively entered into force on 4 November 2016<sup>12</sup>; COP22 (November 2016) thus welcomed the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA 1). COP23, which hosted the second part of the first session of the CMA (CMA 1.2) at the same time, was an important step towards adopting the PA operationalisation rules (Rulebook) in 2018. It also finalised the preparations for the facilitation dialogue provided for under the Agreement; this was renamed the Talanoa Dialogue by the Fijian Presidency of COP23.

6. Decision 2/CP.15.

7. Decision 1/CMP.7, Annex 1.

8. For further information, see [online] <https://unfccc.int/process/the-kyoto-protocol>.


9. Access the updated list [online] [https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg\\_no=XXVII-7-c&chapter=27&clang=\\_en](https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-c&chapter=27&clang=_en)

10. Paris Agreement, UNFCCC, 2015 See [online] [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/paris\\_agreement.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/paris_agreement.pdf).

11. Decision 1/CP.22.

12. See [online] <https://onu.delegfrance.org/Paris-Agreement>

## Negotiations (1998-2015) in a few key dates<sup>13</sup>



## I.2. Return to the Katowice climate package

In December 2018, at Katowice, Poland hosted the 24th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP24), the 14th session of the CMP (CMP14), the third part of the first session of the CMA (CMA 1.3) and the 49th sessions of the permanent subsidiary bodies (SBI 49 and SBSTA 49). This conference culminated in the adoption of the PA Rulebook, despite certain problems being carried forward to the Agenda of COP25/CMA 2, mainly in relation to Article 6 that sets out the cooperation mechanisms. The emphasis placed on the special report of the IPCC, the results of the Talanoa Dialogue and the pre-2020 action also fuelled the debates. A summary deciphering the main decision points<sup>14</sup> is set out below.

13. © Guide to the negotiations of COP25-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2019

14. See [online] [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Informal%20Compilation\\_proposal%20by%20the%20President\\_rev.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Informal%20Compilation_proposal%20by%20the%20President_rev.pdf)

## Deciphering the key points of the Rulebook<sup>15</sup>

Decision	Field	Clarifications on the decision
4/CMA.1	<i>Information (paragraph 28 – 1/CP.21)</i>	The second NDC should provide information to facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding. Guidance is given under Annex I to the Decision.
	<i>Accounting (paragraph 31 – 1/CP.21)</i>	The Parties must avoid double counting of emission reductions and follow the guidance given. The NDC must be quantified within biennial reports. The revision of rules will commence in 2027 for a decision in 2028.
5/CMA.1	<i>NDC Registry (Article 4.12)</i>	The rules and modalities for the structure and use of the NDC registry held by the UNFCCC Secretariat are defined.
6/CMA.1	<i>Common time frames for NDC (Article 4.10)</i>	The implementation periods (currently five to ten years) of NDC commitments are harmonised from 2031 onwards.
7/CMA.1	<i>Forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures</i>	The forum must serve the PA as well as the COP, CMA and CMP. The modalities, work programme and functions of the forum were adopted. The Katowice Committee of Experts (KCI), made up of fourteen members, on the impacts of the implementation of response measures is established. The revision of the rules is planned for 2023.
8/CMA.1	<i>Mechanisms for cooperation and international transfer of outcomes (Article 6)</i>	Disagreements relating to Articles 6.2 and 6.4 persist about the use of mitigation results internationally (ITMO) in NDC accounting. The negotiations will continue during COP25, mainly on the rules for avoiding double counting of emission reductions, taking mitigation into account outside NDC sectors, the continuation of the clean development mechanism(CDM), the principle of global reduction of emissions or the voluntary/mandatory cancellation of carbon credits.
9/CMA.1	<i>Adaptation communication (Articles 7.10 and 7.11)</i>	The elements to be provided in the adaptation communications are stated. These are Party-driven, flexible and must not represent a burden for the developing country Parties. They must not be a basis for comparison between Parties nor subject to review/ evaluation. They can be linked to the reports provided for under Article 13.8 of the Paris Agreement. The revision of the rules is planned for 2025.
10/CMA.1	<i>Adaptation Registry (Article 7.12)</i>	The modalities for the registry are stated. A prototype should be presented in June 2019 in Bonn and a decision on using this prototype as a public registry on adaptation will be made at COP25.

15. Inspired by OIF/IFDD (2019)

Decision	Field	Clarifications on the decision
11/CMA.1	<i>Accelerate and recognise the effort on adaptation by the Parties</i>	The decision emphasises the role of the Adaptation Committee and the LDC Expert Group to serve the PA. Guidance on mobilisation of resources for adaptation and the monitoring and evaluation of adaptation policies is defined.
12/CMA.1	<i>Information relating to finance (Article 9)</i>	The developed countries must supply, starting in 2020, biennial communications relating to Articles 9.5 (amounts of public financial resources planned to be granted to the developing countries) and 9.7 (support already mobilised). The UNFCCC Secretariat is tasked with collecting this information from 2021 onwards to provide input to the global stocktake. The potential revision of the rules is planned for 2023. High-level ministerial dialogues on finance will be organised every two years starting in 2021.
	<i>Type of information to be provided</i>	The Parties are authorised to report all financing, including loans, not just their equivalent donation. They can report the donation equivalent if they so wish. The Parties are invited to clarify any new and additional financing reported.
13/CMA.1	<i>Adaptation Fund</i>	The Adaptation Fund (AF) is going to continue and be dedicated to the PA. Its financing can be associated with the activities carried out under Articles 6, 12 and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol and Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement.
14/CMA.1	<i>Objectives – Finance (Paragraph 53 of Decision 1/CP.21)</i>	Deliberations to increase the goal of USD100 billion per year from 2025 onwards will be initiated in November 2020.
15/CMA.1	<i>Technology Framework (Article 10.4)</i>	The Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) are tasked with implementing the technology framework. Guidance is given and must be incorporated, with details to be provided on this incorporation in their joint annual report.
16/CMA.1	<i>Technology mechanism (Paragraph 69 of Decision 1/CP.21)</i>	The scope and modalities of the periodic evaluation of the effectiveness and appropriateness of the support for the technology mechanism, with a view to the implementation of the PA on the issues of technological development and transfer, are adopted.
17/CMA.1	<i>Awareness-raising, training, education and access to information (Article 12)</i>	The efforts made are referenced as Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE). Actions in this area are encouraged for all Parties.

Decision	Field	Clarifications on the decision
18/CMA.1	<i>Enhanced transparency framework (ETF, Article 13)</i>	<p>The modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency framework are adopted. Biennial reports are to be provided by all the Parties from 2024 onwards, i.e. one year after the global stocktake. Information categories are defined.</p> <p>The ETF rules are common – mandatory for the developed countries, at the discretion of LDC/AOSIS and are the subject of self-determined flexibility for all other Parties. GEF support is planned for developing countries in preparing their report.</p>
19/CMA.1	<i>Global stocktake (Article 14)</i>	<p>The structure of the process of the global stocktake and its modalities are stated. Three stages are defined: collecting information, technical evaluation and consideration of results. Information sources are defined.</p>
20/CMA.1	<i>Implementation of and compliance with the provisions of the Agreement (Article 15.12)</i>	<p>The operating modalities and procedures of the Expert Committee tasked with facilitating implementation of and promoting compliance with the provisions are adopted. This Committee is facilitative, non-adversarial and non-punitive. It imposes no sanction or penalties. The evaluations can be centralised, performed within the country in question, decentralised or conducted according to a simplified process. A review of the operating rules of this committee is planned for 2024.</p>

The Katowice “Climate Package” fixed rules applicable to all Parties, whilst introducing broad flexibility for those that need it, with the transition from a dual approach (industrialised and developing countries) to a triple approach with the LDC and AOSIS who henceforth benefit from a special status, with more flexibility.



Key elements in the Rulebook agreed by the Parties in Katowice (purple) versus the points that are outstanding/carried forward (red)<sup>16</sup>

MITIGATION	MECHANISMS	ADAPTATION	FINANCE	TRANSPARENCY	GLOBAL STOCKTAKE
NDC FEATURES	CONCERTED APPROACH	ADAPTATION COMMUNICATION	EX ANTE INFO	FLEXIBILITY DUE TO CAPACITY	FORMAT AND TIMING
MITIGATION REGISTRY	SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM	ADAPTATION REGISTRY	EX POST INFO		
TIME FRAME	NON-MARKET APPROACH	ADAPTATION FUND			

Among the other decisions made at COP24, it is worth underlining the creation of the Facilitative Working Group for the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform. The mandate of the Consultative Group of Experts on National Communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention is extended for eight years, from 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2016, and its name is changed to Consultative Group of Experts (CGE)<sup>17</sup>.


### 1.3. UNFCCC structure and bodies

The **Conference of the Parties (COP)** represents the supreme body of the Convention. It brings together the Parties (signatory States) to the UNFCCC and also serves as a framework for the CMP and CMA. Two permanent subsidiary bodies serve the COP, CMP and CMA: the **Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI)** and the **Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA)**. The SBI and SBSTA are supported by constituted bodies. Five funds and financial entities are attached officially to the UNFCCC, including the GEF, the Adaptation Fund (AF) and the GCF.

16. © Guide to the negotiations of COP25-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2019 Adapted from Michaelowa A. (Perspectives), 2018.

17. Decision 11/CP24.

## UNFCCC structure<sup>18</sup>



### I.4. The road to COP25: key stages in 2019

The Bonn intersession (SB 50) held on 17-27 June 2019 was intended to advance the work on a certain number of matters relating to the implementation of the Convention and the work programme for the PA. The main negotiating points covered in particular:

- Article 6 on the cooperation mechanisms;
- Inclusion of scientific elements in the negotiations;

18. © Guide to the negotiations of COP25-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2019

- Issues of loss and damage, through the adoption of the reference framework for the review of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) relating to these matters;
- The other current themes mainly linked to the ETF, the Koronivia joint work on agriculture, the composition of the Adaptation Fund Board (AFB) and the question of common time frames for NDC.

## Review of the conclusions of SBSTA 50

Progress made at the 50th session of the SBI included:

- On matters of education and training<sup>19</sup>, a draft decision was published on the terms of reference for the review of the Doha work programme, for consideration and adoption during COP25.
- It was decided<sup>20</sup> to continue its review of the Lima work programme on gender and its action plan for gender equality at the 51st session of the SBI in December 2019.
- A revised version of the guidance to be followed on the national communications of Parties included in Annex I to the Convention<sup>21</sup> was published for adoption by COP25.
- In terms of technology<sup>22</sup>, the recommendations of the TEC report will continue to be considered during COP25. An updated summary report on the Technology Needs Assessment (TNA) should be produced by the Secretariat for review during SBI 52.
- The Parties and observers were invited to submit their views on the review of the work of the Paris Committee on Capacity-building (PCCB) as a summary of communications had to be prepared for review at SBI 51.
- The fourth in-depth review of the implementation of the PCCB in developing countries under the Convention is undertaken. SBI 51 will continue the work to establish a draft decision on enhancing institutional arrangements on capacity-building, for consideration and adoption during COP25<sup>23</sup>.

Matters relating to the revision of modalities and procedures for international assessment and guidelines for international consultations and analyses (associated with the transparency framework) were carried forward to the 54th session of SBI in 2021<sup>24</sup>. Matters relating to the common time frames for NDC<sup>25</sup>, the summary of biennial reports, the report on the national GHG inventories, the terms of reference of the CGE and financial and technical support<sup>26</sup> will be continued at its 51st session.

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19. FCCC/SBI/2019/L.3

20. FCCC/SBI/2019/L.4

21. FCCC/SBI/2019/L.5

22. FCCC/SBI/2019/L.5

23. FCCC/SBI/2019/L.15

24. FCCC/SBI/2019/L.7 and FCCC/SBI/2019/L.8

25. FCCC/SBI/2019/L.10

26. FCCC/SBI/2019/L.11

## Review of the conclusions of SBSTA 50

Several methodological issues arising from the PA were on the SBSTA Agenda, mainly relating to the modalities, procedures and guidelines of the transparency framework of measures and support (provision of common reporting tables, overviews of biennial reports on transparency (BTR), training programme for technical review, etc.). The SBSTA recognised that that developing country Parties should receive support in this area and agreed to debate how to apply the provisions relating to flexibility at its 51st session<sup>27</sup>. Regarding training programmes for experts responsible for the technical review of GHG inventories and biennial reports and national communications of Parties included in Annex I to the Convention, SBSTA agreed to extend them from 2020 to 2022 and assess their relevance and implementation period at its 54th session (May/June 2021)<sup>28</sup>.

Matters relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement were debated intensely, mainly on the guidance on cooperative approaches (CA, Article 6.2), the rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism of paragraph 6.4 and the work programme arising from the non-market approaches (NMA, paragraph 6.8). SBSTA noted the work conducted on these three points, as included in the draft decision text, which would be considered further during its 51st session in December 2019<sup>29</sup>.

## Review of the conclusions of SB 50

The scope of the next periodic review of the long-term goal under the Convention and overall progress made towards achieving it saw diverging views between the Parties during informal consultations<sup>30</sup>. The review of this item was carried forward to SB 51<sup>31</sup>.

On the question of the terms of reference for the 2019 review of the WIM relating to loss and damage, the two subsidiary bodies agreed to undertake this review during SB 51, based on the terms of reference established<sup>32</sup>.

Lastly, on matters associated with the Forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures, the subsidiary bodies took note of the draft rules of procedure prepared by the KCI, which must be considered for adoption at the COP, CMP and CMA. The six-year work plan of the Forum and the KCI must also be completed at SB 51<sup>33</sup>.

27. FCCC/SBSTA/2019/L.3.

28. FCCC/SBSTA/2019/L.4 and L.5

29. FCCC/SBSTA/2019/L.9, L.10 and L.11. See also IISD, 2019

30. IISD, 2019

31. FCCC/SB/2019/L.1


32. FCCC/SB/2019/L.3 and IISD, 2019

33. FCCC/SB/2019/L.4 and IISD, 2019

### Major events 2019

2019 saw major milestones of international climate action events, with at their heart the 2019 United Nations Summits on Climate and the Sustainable Development Goals along with three new regional climate weeks

International climate agenda 2019<sup>34</sup>



34. © Guide to the negotiations of COP25-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2019

## United Nations Climate Action Summit<sup>35</sup>

The United Nations Climate Action Summit (23 September 2019) resulted in a certain number of announcements, including:

- Climate finance: Twelve countries announced financial commitments to the GCF totalling USD7.4 billion, the United Kingdom is going to double its international climate financing for the period 2020-2025 to £11.6 billion, the European Union is going to set aside at least a quarter of its next budget for climate-related actions, etc.
- Transition towards low carbon models: several countries announced their wish to move away gradually from using coal, Germany has committed to being carbon neutral by 2050, India has committed to increasing its renewable energies capacity to 450 GW by 2022 whilst more than ten billion trees could be planted in Pakistan in the next five years.
- Private sector: a group of organisations representing investments of more than USD2000 billion has announced its desire to move towards carbon neutral investment portfolios by 2050; 87 major businesses (with a combined value of more than USD2300 billion) and 130 banks (accounting for one third of the world banking sector) have committed to aligning their activities with the PA goals.

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35. See [online] <https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/un-climate-summit-2019.shtml> and the press release published at the end of the Summit [https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/assets/pdf/CAS\\_closing\\_release.pdf](https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/assets/pdf/CAS_closing_release.pdf)

# II. Introduction to the issues of COP25

## II.1. Conference agendas<sup>36</sup>

COP25 agenda	CMA2 agenda
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Opening of the session.</li> <li>2. Organisational matters :               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Election of the President of COP25 ;</li> <li>b) Adoption of the rules of procedure ;</li> <li>c) Adoption of the agenda ;</li> <li>d) Election of officers other than the President ;</li> <li>e) Admission of organisations as observers ;</li> <li>f) Organisation of work, including for the sessions of the subsidiary bodies ;</li> <li>g) Dates and venues of future sessions ;</li> <li>h) Adoption of the report on credentials.</li> </ol> </li> <li>3. Reports of the subsidiary bodies :               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Report of the SBSTA ;</li> <li>b) Report of the SBI ;</li> </ol> </li> <li>4. Reporting from and review of Parties included in Annex I to the Convention.</li> <li>5. Reporting from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention.</li> <li>6. Report of Adaptation Committee.</li> <li>7. Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage.</li> <li>8. Matters relating to climate finance :               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Long-term climate finance ;</li> <li>b) Matters relating to the SCF ;</li> <li>c) Report of the GCF to COP and guidance to the GCF ;</li> <li>d) Report of the GEF to COP and guidance to the GEF.</li> </ol> </li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Opening of the session</li> <li>2. Organisational matters :               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Adoption of the agenda ;</li> <li>b) Election of additional officers ;</li> <li>c) Organisation of work, including for the sessions of the subsidiary bodies ;</li> <li>d) Approval of the report on credentials ;</li> <li>e) Status of ratification of the Paris Agreement.</li> </ol> </li> <li>3. Reports of the subsidiary bodies :               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Report of the SBSTA ;</li> <li>b) Report of the SBI ;</li> </ol> </li> <li>4. Public registries under the Paris Agreement :               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Modalities and procedures for the operation and use of a public registry referred to in Article 4.12 ;</li> <li>b) Modalities and procedures for the operation and use of a public registry referred to in Article 7.12.</li> </ol> </li> <li>5. Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage.</li> <li>6. Matters relating to climate finance :               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Matters relating to the SCF ;</li> <li>b) Guidance to the GCF ;</li> <li>c) Guidance to the GEF ;</li> <li>d) Matters relating to the Adaptation Fund.</li> </ol> </li> <li>7. Development and transfer of technologies : joint annual report on technology.</li> </ol>

36. See [online] <https://unfccc.int/cop25> As at 12 October 2019. Official document: FCCC/CP/2019/1

COP25 agenda	CMA2 agenda
<p>9. Development and transfer of technologies: joint annual report on technology.</p> <p>10. Capacity-building under the Convention.</p> <p>11. Matters relating to the LDA.</p> <p>12. Report of the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures.</p> <p>13. Gender and climate change.</p> <p>14. Consideration of proposals by Parties for amendments to the Convention under Article 15</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Proposal from the Russian Federation to amend Article 4, paragraph 2(f), of the Convention ;</li> <li>b) Proposal from Papua New Guinea and Mexico to amend Articles 7 and 18 of the Convention ;</li> <li>c) Proposal from Turkey aiming to delete the name of Turkey from the list in Annex I to the Convention.</li> </ul> <p>15. Second review of the adequacy of Article 4, paragraph 2(a) and (b), of the Convention.</p> <p>16. Administrative, financial and institutional matters :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Audit report and financial statements for 2018 ;</li> <li>b) Budget performance for the biennium 2018-2019 ;</li> <li>c) Programme budget for the biennium 2020-2021 ;</li> <li>d) Decision-making in the UNFCCC process.</li> </ul> <p>17. High-level segment :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Statements by Parties ;</li> <li>b) Statements by observer organisations.</li> </ul> <p>18. Other matters.</p> <p>19. Conclusion of the session :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Adoption of the draft report of COP25 ;</li> <li>b) Closure of the session.</li> </ul>	<p>8. Capacity-building under the Paris Agreement.</p> <p>9. Report of the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures.</p> <p>10. Matters relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Guidance on cooperative approaches referred to in Article 6.2 ;</li> <li>b) Rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism created by Article 6.4 ;</li> <li>c) Work programme under the framework for non-market approaches referred to in Article 6.8.</li> </ul> <p>11. Consideration of special needs and special circumstances of Parties :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Proposal from Egypt on behalf of the African Group regarding Africa, under the Paris Agreement ;</li> <li>b) Proposal from Honduras on behalf of the Independent Association for Latin America and the Caribbean regarding developing country Parties, including Latin American States, that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change under the Convention and the Paris Agreement.</li> </ul> <p>12. Administrative, financial and institutional matters :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Audit report and financial statements for 2018 ;</li> <li>b) Budget performance for the biennium 2018-2019 ;</li> <li>c) Programme budget for the biennium 2020-2021 ;</li> </ul> <p>13. High-level segment :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Statements by Parties ;</li> <li>b) Statements by observer organisations.</li> </ul> <p>14. Other matters.</p> <p>15. Conclusion of the session :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Adoption of the draft report of CMA 2 ;</li> <li>b) Closure of the session.</li> </ul>



COP25 agenda	CMA2 agenda
<b>CMP 15 agenda</b>	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Opening of the session.</li> <li>2. Organisational matters :               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Adoption of the agenda ;</li> <li>b) Election of additional officers ;</li> <li>c) Organisation of work, including for the sessions of the subsidiary bodies ;</li> <li>d) Approval of the report on credentials ;</li> <li>e) Status of ratification of the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol.</li> </ol> </li> <li>3. Reports of the subsidiary bodies :               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Report of the SBSTA ;</li> <li>b) Report of the SBI ;</li> </ol> </li> <li>4. Reporting from and review of Parties included in Annex I :               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) National communications ;</li> <li>b) Annual compilation and accounting report for the second commitment period for Annex B Parties under the Kyoto Protocol.</li> </ol> </li> <li>5. Matters relating to the clean development mechanism.</li> <li>6. Matters relating to joint implementation.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>7. Matters relating to the Adaptation Fund.</li> <li>8. Capacity-building under the Kyoto Protocol.</li> <li>9. Report of Compliance Committee.</li> <li>10. Report of the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures.</li> <li>10. Report on the high-level ministerial round table on increased ambition of Kyoto Protocol commitments.</li> <li>12. Administrative, financial and institutional matters :               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Audit report and financial statements for 2018 ;</li> <li>b) Budget performance for the biennium 2018-2019 ;</li> <li>c) Programme budget for the biennium 2020-2021.</li> </ol> </li> <li>13. High-level segment :               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Statements by Parties ;</li> <li>b) Statements by observer organisations.</li> </ol> </li> <li>14. Other matters.</li> <li>15. Conclusion of the session               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Adoption of the draft report of CMP15 ;</li> <li>b) Closure of the session.</li> </ol> </li> </ol>
<b>SBI 51 agenda</b>	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Opening of the session</li> <li>2. Organisational matters :               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Adoption of the agenda ;</li> <li>b) Organisation of the work of the session ;</li> <li>c) Election of officers other than the Chair ;</li> <li>d) Multilateral assessment working group session under the international assessment and review process ;</li> <li>e) Facilitative sharing of views under the international consultation and analysis process ;</li> <li>f) Other mandated events.</li> </ol> </li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Opening of the session.</li> <li>2. Organisational matters :               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Adoption of the agenda ;</li> <li>b) Organisation of the work of the session ;</li> <li>c) Election of officers other than the Chair ;</li> <li>d) Mandated events.</li> </ol> </li> <li>3. Report of Adaptation Committee.</li> <li>4. Report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage and the 2019 review of the WIM.</li> </ol>

COP25 agenda	CMA2 agenda
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3. Reporting from and review of Parties included in Annex I to the Convention :               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Status of the submission and review of seventh national communications third biennial reports of Parties included in Annex 1 of the Convention.</li> <li>b) Compilations and syntheses of second and third biennial reports from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention;</li> <li>c) Reports on national greenhouse gas inventory data from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention for the periods 1990-2016 and 1990-2017.</li> </ol> </li> <li>4. Reporting from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention :               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Information contained in national communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention;</li> <li>b) Report and terms of reference of the Consultative Group of Experts;</li> <li>c) Provision of financial and technical support;</li> <li>d) Summary reports on the technical analysis of biennial update reports of Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention.</li> </ol> </li> <li>5. Common time frames for nationally determined contributions referred to in Article 4.10 of the Paris Agreement.</li> <li>6. Matters relating to the mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol :               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Review of the modalities and procedures for the clean development mechanism;</li> <li>b) Report of the administrator of the international transaction log under the Kyoto Protocol.</li> </ol> </li> <li>7. Scope of the next periodic review of the long-term global goal under the Convention and of overall progress towards achieving it.</li> <li>8. Koronivia joint work on agriculture.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5. Development and transfer of technologies: joint annual report on technology.</li> <li>6. Koronivia joint work on agriculture.</li> <li>7. Matters relating to science and review :               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Scope of the next periodic review of the long-term global goal in the framework of the Convention and of overall progress towards achieving it.</li> <li>b) Research and systematic observation.</li> </ol> </li> <li>8. Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform.</li> <li>9. Matters relating to the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures serving the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement.</li> <li>10. Methodological issues under the Convention :               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Revision of the UNFCCC reporting guidelines on annual inventories for Parties included in Annex I;</li> <li>b) Guidelines for the technical review of information reported under the Convention by Parties included in Annex I related to greenhouse gas inventories, biennial reports and communications;</li> <li>c) GHG data interface;</li> <li>d) Common metrics to calculate the carbon dioxide equivalence of GHG;</li> <li>e) Emissions from fuel used for international aviation and maritime transport.</li> </ol> </li> <li>11. Methodological issues under the Paris Agreement               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Common reporting tables for the electronic reporting of the information in the national inventory reports of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of GHG;</li> <li>b) Common tabular formats for the electronic reporting of the information necessary to track progress made in implementing and achieving nationally determined contributions under Article 4 of the Paris Agreement;</li> </ol> </li> </ol>

COP25 agenda	CMA2 agenda
<p>9. Report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage and the 2019 review of the WIM.</p> <p>10. Report of Adaptation Committee.</p> <p>11. Matters relating to the least developed countries.</p> <p>12. National adaptation plans.</p> <p>13. Technology development and transfer :  a) Joint annual report;  b) Alignment between processes pertaining to the review of the CTCN and the periodic assessment referred to in paragraph 69 of Decision 1/CP.21;  c) Pozna strategic programme on technology transfer</p> <p>14. Matters relating to the Adaptation Fund : membership of the Adaptation Fund Board.</p> <p>15. Matters relating to capacity-building for developing countries :  a) Annual technical progress report of the PCCB;  b) Matters relating to capacity-building under the Convention, including enhancing institutional arrangements and the review of the PCCB.</p> <p>16. Matters relating to the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures serving the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement.</p> <p>17. Gender and climate change.</p> <p>18. Report on activities related to Action for Climate Empowerment.</p> <p>19. Administrative, financial and institutional matters :  a) Audit report and financial statements for 2018;  b) Budget performance for the biennium 2018-2019;  c) Other budgetary matters.</p> <p>20. Other matters.</p> <p>21. Closure of and report on the session.</p>	<p>c) Common tabular formats for the electronic reporting of the information on financial, technology development and transfer and capacity-building support provided and mobilised, as well as support needed and received, under Articles 9 to 11 of the Paris Agreement;</p> <p>d) Outlines of the transparency biennial report, national inventory document and technical expert review report pursuant to the modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency framework for action and support;</p> <p>e) Training programme for technical experts participating in the technical expert review.</p> <p>12. Matters relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement :  a) Guidance on cooperative approaches referred to in Article 6.2;  b) Rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism created by Article 6.4;  c) Work programme under the framework for non-market approaches referred to in Article 6.8.</p> <p>13. Annual reports on technical reviews :  a) Technical review on information reported under the Convention by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention in their biennial reports and national communications;  b) Technical review on greenhouse gas inventories of Parties included in Annex I to the Convention;  c) Technical review on greenhouse gas inventories and other information reported by Parties included in Annex I, as defined in Article 1, paragraph 7, of the Kyoto Protocol.</p> <p>14. Other matters.</p> <p>15. Closure of and report on the session.</p>

## II.2. Summary table of the negotiating issues at COP25

Theme	Negotiating issues at COP25	See Sections
Cooperation mechanisms by virtue of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement	<p>Divergences persist in conjunction with Articles 6.2 and 6.4 about the international use of mitigation outcomes in the NDC accounting and on the non-market approaches (NMA) provided for under Article 6.8. The 50th meeting of the Subsidiary Bodies (SO 50) culminated in three texts (one per approach) that serve as a basis for the negotiations. COP25 should:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Continue the negotiations mainly on the rules for avoiding double counting of mitigation, taking mitigation into account outside NDC sectors and the principle of global reduction of emissions;</li> <li>• Ensure a balanced development of the regulations of the three approaches;</li> <li>• Consider the development of the work programme for forthcoming years and the identification of technical issues that could be resolved later.</li> </ul> <p>Points of contention include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Taking NDC diversity into account in developing harmonised transfer regulations;</li> <li>• The applicability of guidance on Article 6.2, including the relevant adjustments for the use of ITMO for purposes other than for the NDC, transfers under Article 6.4 and transfers and outside the scope of the NDC;</li> <li>• The definition of ITMO and the restriction on the scope of transfers under Article 6.2;</li> <li>• The transition of KP flexibility mechanisms;</li> <li>• The allocation of a proportion of funds generated under Art. 6.2;</li> <li>• The operationalisation of the global mitigation of emissions;</li> <li>• The mode of governance of the mechanism in Article 6.3 (centralised versus decentralised);</li> <li>• The transparency and reporting responsibilities under Article 6.4;</li> <li>• The institutional structure of non-market approaches.</li> </ul>	III
NDC and Communications (Article 4)	<p>Continuation of negotiations relating to common time frames for NDC and their contents, metrics, etc. and preparation for the submission by all Parties of their NDC in 2020.</p> <p>Consideration for decision of the public NDC registry established by the Secretariat in application of Decision 1/CP.21 and targeted in Article 4.12 of the Paris Agreement.</p> <p>Adoption of the revised version of guidelines to be followed in terms of national communications of Parties included in Annex I to the Convention.</p>	IV

Theme	Negotiating issues at COP25	See Sections
Adaptation (Article 7)	<p>Review of reports of the Expert Group for the LDC and the Adaptation Committee, mainly in conjunction with the formulation and production of national adaptation plans (NAP).</p> <p>Consideration and adoption of the public registry for communications on adaptation. The prototype was presented at SB 50.</p> <p>Continuation of negotiations on the rules associated with national communications on adaptation and their contents.</p>	V
Response measures	<p>Review and adoption of the internal regulations of the Katowice Committee of Experts (KCI) on the impact of the implementation of response measures.</p> <p>Completion of the six-year work plan of the Forum on the impact of response measures and of the KCI.</p> <p>Exchange of data and experiences on the analysis and assessment of the impact of the implementation of response measures by the Parties during the second KCI meeting.</p>	V.3
Financing (Article 9)	<p>Review of the results of the first replenishment of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) completed in October 2019 and consideration of the reports of different funds.</p> <p>Continuation of talks on the composition of the Adaptation Fund Board (AFB).</p> <p>Consideration and adoption of the draft guidelines of the Standing Finance Committee (SFC) intended for entities responsible for the operation of the finance mechanism.</p> <p>Definition of guidance to be given to these entities on policies, priority programmes and eligibility criteria linked to the Paris Agreement.</p> <p>Review of the state of progress of the SFC four-yearly report on determining the needs of developing countries for the implementation of the Convention and the PA, which is scheduled for review with effect from COP26.</p> <p>Consideration and adoption of the Secretariat's biennial budget 2020-2021.</p> <p>Continuation of the consideration and negotiations on long-term financing, the associated objective and matters of transparency.</p>	VI

Theme	Negotiating issues at COP25	See Sections
Transparency (Article 13)	<p>The negotiations during SBSTA 50 (June 2019) culminated in a draft conclusion<sup>37</sup> and four informal notes for consideration at COP25. Aspects still to be defined or settled are as follows<sup>38</sup>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Application of provisions relating to flexibility in national inventory reports (NIR), NDC reporting formats and tabular formats regarding the support provided and mobilised.</li> <li>• Development of reporting tables (based on those existing or not).</li> <li>• Development of common tabular formats for reporting on the support provided and mobilised and the support needed and received from identified elements.</li> <li>• Taking into account the capacities of countries, the development level and access to training along with sharing of experiences.</li> </ul>	VII
Capacity-building (Article 11)	<p>Review by SBI of the summary of communications of Parties and observers on the work of the Paris Committee on Capacity-building (PCCB).</p> <p>Continuation of the fourth in-depth review of the implementation of the PCCB in the developing countries under the Convention.</p> <p>Continuation of work to establish a draft decision on enhancing institutional arrangements on capacity-building, for consideration and adoption at the COP.</p>	VIII
Technology (Article 10)	<p>Review of the joint report of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network, including information on the incorporation of technology framework guidance in their work plans and programmes.</p> <p>Review of recommendations figuring in the report on the assessment of the Poznan programme.</p>	IX
Loss and damage (Article 8)	<p>Consideration of the terms of reference for the review of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) relating to loss and damage.</p>	X

37. UNFCCC 2019: FCCC/SBSTA/2019/L.3 See [online] [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sbsta2019\\_L03E.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sbsta2019_L03E.pdf)

38. Informal notes prepared by the co-facilitators relating to agenda items 10(a)-(c) of 26 June 2019 and agenda items 10(d) and (e) of 25 June 2019.

Theme	Negotiating issues at COP25	See Sections
Gender and gender equality	Consideration of the summary report by the Secretariat on monitoring progress made in the implementation of the gender equality action plan, to prepare recommendations for the COP.  Continuation of the review by SBI of the Lima work plan on gender and the aforementioned action plan.	XI
Agriculture	Continuation of the review of matters relating to agriculture in conjunction with the constituted bodies.  Holding of a workshop on improved use of nutrients and manure management for sustainable and resilient agricultural systems and review of reports of the two previous workshops.	XII
Education, awareness-raising (Article 12)	Revision and adoption of the draft decision from SBI 50 on the terms of reference for the review of the Doha work programme. This provides for the launch of this review during SBI 52 in 2020 to enhance the application of Article 6 of the Convention and Article 12 of the PA.	XIII
Ambition and action of non-Party entities	Continuation of negotiations on the scope of the next periodic review of the long-term goal under the Convention and overall progress accomplished towards achieving it.  Continuation of talks on incorporating the latest scientific data and the necessary rise in global ambition.  Continuation of efforts under CMP 15 for the ratification of the Doha Amendment to the KP and the enhancing of the pre-2020 ambition level.  Holding of events especially under cover of the Marrakesh Partnership and publication of the 2019 Climate Action Yearbook.	I and XIV

### II.3. The main negotiating groups

Each Party can be represented at the sessions organised under the auspices of the Convention, its ancillary legal instruments and their constituted bodies by a national delegation. The Parties then negotiate within strategic alliances through formal and less formal (*ad hoc*) coalitions to state their positions and serve their interests in the negotiations. Formal negotiating groups<sup>39</sup>

39. The terms Formal or Informal are used in this case in accordance with the recognition of the group by the United Nations System in the majority of UN negotiating forums. As an example, the informal groups do not name/elect representatives in the groups formed under the UNFCCC.

- ***The African Group of Negotiators***<sup>40</sup> (AGN) comprises 54 member countries. AGN currently makes common declarations, mainly on matters relating to adaptation, transfer of technologies, capacity-building, transparency, climate financing, response measures, loss and damage, legal and compliance matters, mitigation and NDC, systematic research and observation and the global stocktake.
- The Group of ***Small Island Developing States*** (SIDS) is active as a coalition in both the United Nations negotiations and under the UNFCCC. The SIDS were recognised for the first time as a group of developing countries in its own right during the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Its member countries cover almost all the continents of the globe, which makes it a significant and impressive negotiating group. It often combines, for certain of its positions, with the AGN, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the Least Developed Countries (LDC).
- ***The Least Developed Countries***<sup>41</sup> (LDC) are low revenue countries confronted by heavy structural obstacles. They are highly vulnerable to economic, social and environmental shocks. There are currently 47 LDC<sup>42</sup> following the 2017 update by the United Nations<sup>43</sup>. The LDC mainly focus on matters of loss and damage, adaptation or unconditional recognition of the 1.5°C objective.
- ***The Group of 77 + China*** (G-77 + China)<sup>44</sup> is an alliance of developing countries comprising 134 members. It tries hard to develop a common position on the main negotiating topics. Since COP21, the group has found it increasingly difficult to negotiate with one and the same voice mainly due to the diversity of its component small groups and alliances which diverge on views on certain key negotiating topics.
- ***The European Union*** (EU) is a political and economic union of 28 member States<sup>45</sup>. The EU is itself a Party to the UNFCCC, KP<sup>46</sup> and the PA, without however having a separate voting right from that of its individual member States. The country holding the EU presidency – which rotates every six months – thus speaks for the EU and its 28 member States<sup>47</sup>.

40. See [online] <https://africangroupofnegotiators.org/>

41. See [online] <http://www ldc-climate.org/>

42. 33 in Africa, thirteen in Asia and one in the Caribbean

43. Official LDC list [online] [https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/publication/ldc\\_list.pdf](https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/publication/ldc_list.pdf).

44. See [online] <http://www.g77.org>.

45. Brexit, the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union, had not occurred at the time of writing this document.

46. Initially as the European Economic Community

47. See [online] <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016D1316&from=fr>.



- ***The Umbrella Group*** is a flexible coalition of developed countries which do not belong to the EU. It comes from the JUSSCANNZ group<sup>48</sup> and is active in all United Nations forums. The composition of the group is not always the same.
- ***The Environmental Integrity Group*** was formed in 2000 by members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) which did not agree with the positions adopted by the Umbrella Group, namely Switzerland, Mexico and South Korea. It has subsequently been joined by Georgia, Liechtenstein and Monaco<sup>49</sup>. The group is normally coordinated by Switzerland.

The main informal groups include:

- ***The Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)*** grouping eight countries with a progressive vision regarding the reduction of emissions.
- ***The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)*** unites small island and low-lying coastal countries sharing development problems and similar concerns in terms of environment, especially their vulnerability to the adverse effects of climate change. AOSIS groups 44 States and observers, including 39 which are members of the United Nations.
- ***The Coalition for Rainforest Nations***<sup>50</sup> was formed in 2005 on the initiative of Papua New Guinea and includes some fifty countries. Its goal is to achieve recognition of the efforts made by developing countries to slow down emissions caused by deforestation.
- ***The BASIC group*** is formed by Brazil, South Africa, India and China<sup>51</sup>. It was founded in 2009 to define a common stance with a view to COP15. Since then, the group regularly meets in order to coordinate its positions and develop a shared strategy.
- ***The Group of Countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Albania and Moldova (CACAM)*** groups countries from Eastern and Central Europe and Central Asia. These countries have created a coalition seeking recognition for their status as non-Annex I Parties with economies in transition under the Convention and the KP<sup>52</sup>.
- ***The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America*** (ALBA) became a six-country coalition in 2010: Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Antigua and Barbuda, joined occasionally by Dominica and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

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48. JUSSCANNZ is an acronym for Japan, United States of America, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway and New Zealand.

49. Yamin, F. and Depledge, J., 2004.

50. See [online] <http://www.rainforestcoalition.org>

51. SEI, 2010

52. Coalition of Rainforest Nations, 2015. See [online] [www.rainforestcoalition.org](http://www.rainforestcoalition.org)

- *The Like Minded Group of States (LMDC)* is a coalition created during the 2012 intersession. LMDC is made up of countries from the Arab world, India, China, several emerging Asian economies and certain active South American and African Parties.
- *The Arab Group* is made up of 22 member States from the League of Arab States. The contours of this coalition are well defined inasmuch as its members have been accustomed to working together since 1945. Their positions in the climate negotiations are regularly and carefully coordinated, often by Saudi Arabia,
- *The Climate Vulnerability Forum*<sup>53</sup> is an international South-South cooperation partnership. It met for the first time near Malé, in the Maldives, in November 2009.. It comprises 48 developing countries from different regions

Other formal and informal groups or coalitions also collaborate to defend their interests in negotiations under the Convention, like the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Cartagena Dialogue countries.

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53. See [online] <https://thecvf.org/about/>.

# III. Cooperation mechanisms under the Paris Agreement

## State of progress of the negotiations on the points relating to Article 6 of the PA

Although the PA work programme was adopted at COP24, matters relating to Article 6 were left hanging, constituting a major gap in the Katowice “climate package”. Let us add here that the Parties decided that two texts per agenda item (6.2, 6.4 and 6.8) would serve as a basis for the SBSTA negotiations in June 2019 – the one suggested by the subsidiary body at the start of the session and the latest version of the proposal from the Presidency of Katowice.

Negotiations during this intersession featured conflicts over certain key issues, but also huge technical complexity. The start of the session proved tricky, with divergences focusing mainly on paragraph 77(d) of the decision on the modalities, procedures and guidance (MPG) on transparency<sup>54</sup>, a paragraph linked to the information to be provided by Parties using cooperative approaches (CA). During the second week, the Parties debated key points in informal consultations that required further discussion.

The Parties ultimately agreed on three texts (one on each cooperative approach) which will serve as the basis for negotiations at COP25:

- On Article 6.2, agreement is emerging on the CA reporting and review process. Accounting in the context of non-homogeneous NDC and of transfers from sectors not covered by the NDC, triggers for corresponding adjustments and the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMO) for purposes other than for the NDC are among points of contention to be resolved, in the same way as the levy of a share of proceeds for adaptation and application of the net global mitigation to the transfers made.
- The mechanism by virtue of Article 6.4 will be administered by an international supervisory body. It will constitute a design, implementation, issuing and transfer process for emission reduction units known as “A6.4ER”. Key points to be resolved include the accounting of transfers (and the link with the CA of Article 6.2), the design of activities and principles guiding the development of associated methodologies and the transition of KP flexibility mechanisms, especially the CDM.
- A central issue for the non-market approaches (NMA) is defining the NMA framework as an instrument facilitating the exchange between Parties or as a climate finance mobilisation mechanism. This fundamental question must direct the development and governance of the work programme under Article 6.8.

54. Decision 18/CMA.1

### III.1. Context of negotiations and main issues

The technical and political levels of the negotiations on the approaches of Article 7 are extremely interdependent and feature complex links between the three approaches, which made progress in negotiations difficult to achieve. Positions on a draft text only came together at the end of SBSTA 50 and no obvious solution on the key issues currently being debated emerged, all the more so that the texts from the intersession include new concepts and ideas.

Beyond the debates on the modalities, procedures and guidance, the development of the work programme for forthcoming years and the identification of technical issues that could be resolved later must be considered. Let us also underline the strong existing interdependence with Article 4.13 (NDC accounting), Article 13 (Transparency framework) and Article 14 (Global Stocktake), for which decisions have already been adopted. The challenge is thus to be able to agree on the guidelines for Article 7 that are consistent with these decisions, without them prejudicing the outcomes of the negotiations.

### III.2. Progress of negotiations since COP24

Negotiations since COP24 have resulted in some progress:

- Consensus is emerging on the governance structure of CA in terms of the reporting and review process, in conjunction with the ETF. This now involves determining what will be the reporting requirements governing the Parties and the scope of the review on the CA. Furthermore, several matters relating to the operationalisation of ITMO accounting still have to be settled.
- Consensus seems to be emerging over the mechanism of Article 6.4 so that it is administered by a supervisory body that will monitor and issue emission reduction credits (A6.4ER). The supervisory body will approve the eligibility of methodologies for mitigation activities in particular with respect to baselines and determining the additionality. One pre-condition for participation will be for the Parties to have communicated their NDC and have an established Designated National Authority. The challenge remains to agree on the design of activities and methodologies and on the transition of the KP mechanisms.
- There is consensus that the activities by virtue of these two approaches aim to promote mitigation and adaptation, increase the participation of the public and private sector in implementing NDC and facilitate the coordination through international instruments and arrangements.

### III.3. Cooperative approaches


The points of contention over the CA relate to the governance, the roles and responsibilities of Parties, the accounting and definition of ITMO and the inclusion of activities to reduce deforestation. Levying a share of proceeds of CA to finance adaptation actions is strongly contested, as is the application of the principle of global emission mitigation in Article 6.2.

The operationalisation of the accounting of ITMO transfers through “corresponding adjustments” is a technically complex and politically sensitive issue. This process is however essential to avoid the double counting of emissions in NDC reporting and is a lever for ensuring the environmental integrity of CA and the credibility of the carbon market.

The guidance on the corresponding adjustments still has to specify the processes and the timetable to be followed whilst taking the diversity of the NDC into account<sup>55</sup>; the challenge here is to develop common guidelines that take account of this diversity in terms of metrics, type of target and frequency. Furthermore, there are diverging positions over the eligibility of sectors and gases not covered by the NDC and the activities carried outside the Convention to generate ITMO.

The points of contention relating to governance involve the definition and scope of the terms of reference of the technical expert review (TEMA6). A strong mandate would allow the experts to review procedural aspects of registering and communicating information and consider environmental integrity and the solidity of reported activities and methodologies. The same question is raised for the UNFCCC Secretariat’s mandate in its verifications of database coherence of Article 6. In addition, the roles and responsibilities of Parties still require clarifying with respect to information registered in the database and the report submission period also has not yet been defined.

## Reporting and review process by virtue of Article 6 under the ETF<sup>56</sup>



55. Michaelowa, A., Greiner, S., 2018.

56. Climate Group and Climate Focus outlook for a study commissioned by the Swedish Energy Agency. ENERGIES 2050 Iconography © Guide to the Negotiations of the COP25-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2019. Based on Michaelowa *et al.* (2019b)


Another point of contention is due to the fact that to date there is no consensual definition of what is an ITMO: is it a unit that can be exchanged in the international carbon markets or an accounting unit that can only be exchanged between Parties as part of their specific cooperation? The first case requires a clear definition of ITMO in the guidance given by the Convention. The second option leaves the contracting Parties free to define what they consider ITMO to be, a definition that would only valid under their collaboration.

### **III.4. Mechanism of Article 6.4**

At the heart of the negotiations on Article 6.4 figure matters of governance, reporting responsibilities of Parties, transition of the Kyoto mechanisms, determination of additionality and baselines and the operationalisation of the levying of a share of funds from this mechanism. Two options are being discussed regarding the governance of the mechanism:

1. A centralised governance structure, in which the host country responsibilities would be limited to the approval or authorisation processes. The governance would be the remit of the supervisory body which will accredit the Designated Operational Entities (DOE), approve the methodologies and issue credits to the respective account of the mechanism registry.
2. A decentralised or “dual” governance structure that provides for more extensive responsibilities for the host countries. These could determine which activities would be pursued by virtue of the mechanism, after clarifying their link with the NDC, the approaches used to determine the baselines, the methodologies being applied and which criteria of additionality must the activities meet. They could also establish their own accreditation systems for the DOE.


Sharing of responsibilities in a centralised vs. dual governance system<sup>57</sup>



Regarding the reporting and account of transfers under the mechanism, the debates cover the application of guidance on Article 6.2 to the activities of Article 6.4. Alternatively, the supervisory body could establish specific responsibilities for Parties participating in the mechanism. Diverging positions also exist on whether the A6.4ER constitute ITMO from their first transfer (a project developer to the account of a purchasing country) or simply under secondary transfers (between Parties).

57. © Guide to the negotiations of COP25-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2019 Based on Michaelowa et al. (2019b)

## Options for the transfers of emission reductions<sup>58</sup>



58. © Guide to the negotiations of COP25-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2019 Based on Michaelowa et al. (2019b)



In this respect, a few Parties are demanding a differentiated procedure between the sectors covered and not covered by the NDC: whilst the “corresponding adjustments” would apply to transfers of ITMO from sectors covered by the NDC, the guidelines of Article 6.2 would not apply if the activity took place in a sector not covered by an NDC, to avoid restricting opportunities for mitigation. Other Parties criticise this type of accounting exemption; they highlight the risks of double counting of mitigation and a perverse incentive not to extend the scope of NDC to the entire economy.


The second major issue is the follow-up given to the Kyoto mechanisms. A distinction must be made here between re-using carbon credits (transfer of all sort of units pre-2020, including CER issued by the CDM), the transition of methodologies developed under the CDM and of activities registered under this mechanism. This matter is not only negotiated by the CMA, but is also discussed under the CMP which has the authority over the CDM.

Another key issue is whether the supervisory body of Article 6.4 determines the additionality using the approaches developed under the CDM (e.g. investment tests) or whether it also takes into account the NDC of Parties and the political and legal context of the country. Regarding the baselines, several approaches are being discussed, including re-using the CDM methodologies, applying best available technology (BAT) scenarios or applying historical emission trends. Whilst this topic is discussed explicitly above all under the mechanism under Article 6.4, the issue of additionality is also relevant to ensure environmental integrity under the CA. There is consensus lastly for a share of proceeds to be levied under the Article 6.4 mechanism for adaptation purposes, but it has yet to be determined whether or not the levy will be monetary.

### **III.5. Non-market-based approaches (NMA)**

The ultimate objective of the NMA framework and, therefore, of the work programme for its implementation remains a key element in the negotiations. Whereas certain Parties see in the framework a mechanism in its own right, with the goal of mobilising resources to implement approaches, others see it as a simply instrument for sharing experiences and information.

## Interpretations of the framework for NMA and implications for the governance structure<sup>59</sup>



59. © Guide to the negotiations of COP25-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2019

# IV. Key elements linked to Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC)

The processes of negotiations led under the auspices of the Convention play an essential role in order to facilitate the development, implementation and monitoring of NDC. They must also enhance the ambition over time, to strive toward achieving the long-term collective goals of the PA. The related provisions include in particular the submission by Parties of an updated NDC every five years starting in 2020, every time more ambitious than the previous one, the communication by 2020 of their low-carbon development strategies for the middle of the century<sup>60</sup> and a first five-year global stocktake in 2023, to assess the collective progress compared with the long-term goals of the PA.

Political cycles of NDC<sup>61</sup>



60. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 35.

61. © Guide to the negotiations of COP25-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2019 Adapted and translated from German Environment Agency, 2018.

The modalities and sources of data for the 2023 global stocktake are stated in Decision 19/CMA.1. The information collecting and preparation component will commence one session (of subsidiary bodies) before the technical assessment (2021). This will itself be organised during the two to three successive sessions of the subsidiary bodies (2022) prior to CMA 6 (November 2023), during which the results will be reviewed<sup>62</sup>. The results of this stocktake will inform the revision process of Parties' NDC which should be submitted in 2025.

## IV.1. NDC-related decisions of CMA 1.3

Decision 4/CMA.1 on the *additional guidance in relation to the mitigation section of Decision 1/CP.21* reaffirms the support to be provided to the developing country Parties to increase their ability to develop, communicate and account for their NDC along with the special status of LDC and SIDS in the establishment and accounting of their strategies<sup>63</sup>. Information to be provided to improve clarity, transparency and comprehension must be included in the second NDC onwards. The type of information to be provided has been added in the annex to the Decision<sup>64</sup>.

Regarding NDC accounting, it is recalled that the Parties must promote “*environmental integrity, transparency, accuracy, completeness, comparability and consistency, and ensure the avoidance of double counting*”. The guidance emerging from the work of the APA for emission accounting must be included in the second NDC and the Parties must report on their progress within the biennial transparency reports (BTR)<sup>65</sup>.

The review and updating of information to be provided to ensure clarity, transparency and comprehension and guidance for NDC accounting will be included on the negotiating agenda for the tenth session of the CMA (CMA 10) in 2027, for a decision at CMA 11 in 2028. The CMA will continue to consider other guidance on NDC characteristics during its seventh session (CRA 7) in 2024<sup>66</sup>. The CMA also decided to apply common time frames to NDC from 2013 onwards and requested the SBI to continue its analysis of this matter at the Bonn intersession in June 2019<sup>67</sup>.

The modalities and procedures of the operation and use of the mitigation registry were adopted and added as an annex to Decision 5/CMA.1<sup>68</sup>. The review of the temporary public registry<sup>69</sup> established by the Secretariat will continue for a

62. Decision 19/CMA.1.

63. Decision 4/CMA.1.

64. Decision 4/CMA.1.

65. Decision 4/CMA.1.

66. Decision 4/CMA.1.

67. Decision 6/CMA.1.

68. Decision 5/CMA.1.

69. See [online] <https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/All.aspx>

decision at CMA 2<sup>70</sup>. Parties which have incorporated a national communication on adaptation in their NDC or submitted it at the same time are invited to use the guidance set out in the annex to Decision 9/CMA.1.

Decision 18/CMA.1 adopting the modalities, procedures and guidelines for the purposes of the transparency framework for action and support referred to in Article 13 provides a certain number of elements relating to the NDC. The guiding principles of the transparency framework reiterate the special status of LDC and SIDS and the need to grant developing country Parties a certain flexibility given their capacities<sup>71</sup>. One section of the BTR is dedicated to the information needed to monitor progress made by each Party in the implementation and execution of its NDC. It gives in particular a certain number of clarifications on the indicators chosen to monitor the progress of Parties, especially within their first biennial report<sup>72</sup>. Lastly, a global assessment of NDC will serve as a source of data for the global stocktake<sup>73</sup>.

## **IV.2. Key points of the Bonn intersession and issues of COP25**

### **Common NDC time frames**

The decision to establish common NDC time frames with effect from 2031 was hailed by several groups during informal consultations at the SBI 50. Divergences appeared on taking a decision on these common time frames as soon as 2019, which would make it easier for some Parties to plan and develop future NDC. The SBI ultimately decide to continue to consider this matter during its 51st session, to review and decision by the CMA<sup>74</sup>.

### **Common tables for tracking progress made in implementing NDC**

During the 50th session of the SBSTA, the Parties reviewed the table of biennial reports (BR) on progress made in the quantified economy-wide emissions reduction target as a starting point. Several developed countries said only minor changes would be needed to align this table with the modalities, procedures and guidelines of the ETF. Developing countries pointed to the flexibilities established by the ETF and that therefore information on the progress of NDC in terms of mitigation should only be provided to the extent possible<sup>75</sup>. On the provision of a structured

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70. Decision 5/CMA.1.

71. Decision 18/CMA.1.

72. Decision 18/CMA.1.

73. Decision 19/CMA.1.

74. IISD, 2019

75. Ibid.

summary of this progress, consensus was reached to reaffirm that this is a conditional requirement and to recall the need to welcome different types of NDC. Negotiations on these various items will continue at the 51st session of the SBSTA<sup>76</sup>.

### **Matters relating to NDC and Article 6 of the PA**

The work on common table templates to monitor progress in implementing and executing NDC did not include discussions relating to Article 6, in anticipation of results from negotiations associated with this article<sup>77</sup>.

## **IV.3. State of NDC commitments to the 1.5°C and 2°C goals**

All scientific studies emphasise the existing gap between the NDC commitments, current emission pathways and those that could be consistent with global warming limited to 1.5°C or even 2°C by the end of the century, compared with pre-industrial temperature levels. The IPCC Special Report on global warming of 1.5°C underlines in particular that scenarios compatible with holding the rise in average temperatures below 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot by 2100 require a drop of about 45 % in GHG anthropogenic emissions by 2030 (25 % for the 2°C scenarios), compared with 2010, to achieve a net zero level towards the mid-century (2070 for the 2°C scenarios)<sup>78</sup>.

By taking account of mitigation targets of Parties indicated in their NDC, global GHG emissions in 2030 could reach 52 to 58 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq. This volume is inconsistent with the 1.5°C goal, even if supplemented by widespread deployment of carbon capture technologies<sup>79</sup>. The ninth edition of the UN Environment (UNEP) report<sup>80</sup> on the gap between the needs and the outlook for reducing greenhouse gas emissions (Gap Report) agrees wholeheartedly with this. According to the Climate Action Tracker forecasts, continuing with current policies will lead to a global warming level of 3°C to 3.5°C by 2100<sup>81</sup>.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid.

78. IPCC, 2018b.

79. Ibid.

80. UNEP, 2018

81. See [online] <https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/>

# V. Adaptation

The PA recognises adaptation as a key component in the long-term global response to climate change (Article 7.2) and underlines the importance of on-going, enhanced support in this field (Articles 7.6 and 7.13). The Parties should thus intensify their cooperation with a view to improving the action for adaptation, taking account of the Cancún Adaptation Framework<sup>82</sup> (Article 7.7). Each Party is required, as it suits it, to engage in adaptation planning processes and implement measures that consist especially of introducing or enhancing plans, policies and/or contributions, which may include the formulation of NAP, assessment of climate change and vulnerability to this change and building resilience (Article 7.9)<sup>83</sup>. Each Party must, also, submit and update periodically a communication on adaptation, which will serve the global stocktake, can be incorporated in an NAP, an NDC and/or an NC (Article 7.10).

## V.1. Report of Adaptation Committee and NAP

During the third part of its first session (CMA 1.3, December 2013), the CMA had especially<sup>84</sup> decided that the Adaptation Committee and the LEG would work together on implementing the PA and requested the Adaptation Committee to establish a technical document on methods for assessing adaptation needs and their application, as well as on the gaps, good practices, lessons learned and guidelines, for consideration and recommendations to SBSTA 57 (November 2022).

COP24 also asked<sup>85</sup> the LEG and the Adaptation Committee to consider gaps and needs related to the process to formulate and implement NAP and how to address them and to provide information thereon in the LEG report to SBI 51 (December 2019) and in the annual Adaptation Committee report to COP25. It also requested the SBI to specify the actions and steps to be adopted to assess progress made in the process to formulate and implement NAP at its 55th session (November 2021), with a view to launching the assessment no later than 2025 and to note NAP for the first global stocktake in 2023<sup>86</sup>.

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82. See Decision 1/CP.16 [online] <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/cop16/fre/07a01f.pdf>.

83. ECBI, 2016.

84. Decision 11/CMA.1

85. Decision 8/CP.24

86. IISD, 2018c.

## V.2. Decision 9/CMA.1 relating to communications on adaptation

The new guidance on adaptation communications was adopted in Katowice<sup>87</sup> and targets mainly strengthening the importance of adaptation, its balance with mitigation and action and support in this area for developing countries. It also targets contextual flexibility, including in the choice of distribution vehicle, without imposing an additional burden on developing countries. The Decision also sets out the structure of national communications.

Collaboration between the Adaptation Committee and the IPCC Group II to develop draft optional additional guidance for the countries is planned for COP27 (November 2022), along with the assessment of current rules and procedures to rule on their revision (planned, if appropriate, for COP28). The CMA<sup>88</sup> invited the GEF to provide appropriate financial support to developing countries to develop their national communications on adaptation and encourages the GCF, GEF, AF, CTCN and PCCB to support developing countries in implementing adaptation measures identified.

### Registration of National Communications on Adaptation

Paragraph 12 of PA Article 4 provides for the NDC to be registered in a public registry managed by the Secretariat. The negotiations on this registry covered, at COP24, the development of modalities and procedures for its operation and use<sup>89</sup>. Paragraph 10 of Article 7 provides for setting up a registry for communications on adaptation. CMA decided in this domain<sup>90</sup>:

- that the public registry made available would have two sections, one for the NDC and one for the national communications on adaptation;
- that the Secretariat would present a registry prototype in June 2019, administer it and submit it for consideration and adoption by CMA 2 (December 2019).

## V.3. Forum on the impact of response measures

CMA 1.3 decided that the Forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures<sup>91</sup> would serve the application of the PA. The operating modalities, six-year work programme and functions of the Forum were adopted. The Katowice Committee of Experts on the impacts of the implementation of response measures (KCI), made up of fourteen members, was established to support the forum in executing its programme.

87. Decision 9/CMA.1

88. Decision 9/CMA.1.

89. IISD, 2018c.

90. Decision 10/CMA.1.

91. Decision 7/CMA.1.



The report of the KCI, which met for the first time on 13-14 June 2019, was presented at the SB 50 (Bonn, June 2019). The main stumbling blocks between the Parties concerned in particular the references to activities on needs and financing and the developing of guidelines for economic diversification. The draft rules of procedure prepared by the KCI must be considered for adoption at the COP, CMP and CMA. SB 51 (December 2019) should also see the completion of the six-year work programme of the Forum and the KCI<sup>92</sup>.

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92. FCCC/SB/2019/L.4. See also IISD, 2019.

## VI. Financing

Two highly-important deadlines for international climate finance under the auspices of the Convention occurred in 2018 and 2019: the seventh replenishment of the GEF resources (GEF7)<sup>93</sup> and the first replenishment of the GFC resources<sup>94</sup>. On this occasion, 27 countries committed to replenishing the GFC to the tune of USD9.776 billion<sup>95</sup>. The biennial report of the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) was also presented at COP24.

### VI.1. Main components of the third biennial assessment of the SCF

According to the third biennial assessment of the SCF for the 2015-2016 period<sup>96</sup>, an annual volume of USD58 billion was dedicated to public climate finance, mainly for mitigation and with a significant proportion of concessional loans. This volume remains well below the objectives and needs expressed by the developing country Parties under their NDC and the various negotiating sessions.

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
93. GEF, 2018a.

94. See [online] <https://www.greenclimate.fund/news/gcf-second-replenishment-meeting-reaches-agreement-on-key-decisions-selects-paris-for-pledging-conference>.

95. See [online] <https://www.greenclimate.fund/event/pledging-conference>.

96. See [online] <https://unfccc.int/topics/climate-finance/resources/biennial-assessment-of-climate-finance>

## Climate finance 2015-2016, aggregated over one year, in USD billion<sup>97</sup>



All flows together (including private funds), the Parties not included in Annex I of the Convention received a total volume of USD64.9 billion in 2015 and USD74.5 billion in 2016, with a majority coming through bilateral, regional and other climate finance-specific channels, against a very small proportion coming from the Convention and multilateral climate funds (USD1.4 and 2.4 billion in total, respectively, for 2015 and 2016)<sup>98</sup>. In addition, the issue of accessibility and above all relatively low disbursement levels for projects, although approved, remains.

## VI.2. Long-term climate financing

Long-term climate finance is one of the most sensitive issues in negotiations. The challenge is to establish the foreseeability and the predictability of the mobilisation and availability of financial resources by the developed countries and through

97. © Guide to the negotiations of COP25-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2019 Adapted from UNFCCC data accessible [online] <https://unfccc.int/topics/climate-finance/resources/biennial-assessment-of-climate-finance>

98. SFC, 2019

multilateral and bilateral funds. The process set up for this purpose is thus limited to two main annual activities, namely (i) a workshop on a long-term financing-related theme during the sessions of subsidiary bodies and (ii) negotiating time during the COP to define the actions in this area.

In the continuity of this approach, the COP24<sup>99</sup> urged the developed countries to increase the financing mobilised for climate action, noted the biennial communications of developed countries on their updated strategies and approaches to scale up climate finance between 2018 and 2020 and decided the themes for the 2019 and 2020 sessions on long-term climate financing.

### **VI.3. Problems associated with climate finance bodies**

#### **Adaptation Fund (AF)**

Three main issues were at the heart of the discussions on the AF during COP24:

- The consideration and approval of the report of the Adaptation Fund Board (AFB) by CMP 14 regarding the assessments and outlook of the AF;
- The broadening of the FA operating modalities serving the PA;
- The organisation and composition of the AFB so that it can serve the PA.

When considering the AFB report, COP14<sup>100</sup>:

- noted the accreditation of 28 national implementing entities, the cumulative project and programme approvals and the contributions for a total amount of USD95.9 million paid to the AF in 2017;
- expressed concern over the predictability of the AF resources, as its only current predictable source of revenues shrouded in uncertainty as to the prices of the CER<sup>101</sup>.

CMA 1 furthermore decided<sup>102</sup>, supplemented and confirmed by Decision 2/CMP.14<sup>103</sup> of the CMP, that the Fund would assist in the application of the PA by following the guidance of the CMA and reporting to it for all matters relating to the PA, with effect from 1 January 2019<sup>104</sup>. In terms of the composition of the AFB, the main problem is still to reach agreement on the balance of representation between developed and developing countries

99. Decision 3/CP.24

100. Decision 2/CMP.14.

101. IISD, 2018c.

102. Decision 13/CMA.1.

103. Decision 1/CMP.14.

104. IISD, 2018c.

## Standing Committee on Finance (SCF)

CMA 1 reached the following elements of decision regarding the SFC:

- the SFC, LDCF and the SCCF serve the PA;
- the SCF is invited to prepare draft guidance for the entities entrusted with the operation of the financial mechanism for consideration and adoption at CMA 2;
- the CMA will give guidance to the entities entrusted with the operation of the financial mechanism of the Convention on the policies, priority programmes and eligibility criteria related to the PA for transmission by the COP<sup>105</sup>.

COP24 welcomed<sup>106</sup> with appreciation the 2018 biennial assessment taking stock of the financial flows for climate action. It requested the SCF to prepare, every four years, a report on the determination of the needs of developing country related to implementing the Convention and the PA, for consideration starting at COP26/CMA 3 (November 2020). Progress on this matter will be reviewed at COP25.

## Report of the Green Climate Fund (GFC)

The GFC report to the COP is a central activity in the financial mechanism of the Convention. Having reviewed this report and considered the draft guidance, COP24<sup>107</sup> requested the GCF Board to continue its consideration of procedures for adopting decisions in the event that all efforts at reaching consensus have been exhausted and stressed the urgency in paying the pledges announced for the first replenishment of resources that must be completed in October 2019<sup>108</sup>. At its 23rd session in July 2019, the GCF Board managed ultimately to adopt a decision<sup>109</sup> adopting the procedures for adopting decisions in the event that all efforts at reaching consensus have been exhausted, as provided for in the governance instrument of the Fund.

## Report of the Global Environment Facility (GEF)

When considering the GEF report and the draft guidance by the SCF<sup>110</sup>, COP24 in particular:

- highlighted the importance of enhancing country ownership in the impact programmes of the seventh replenishment of the GEF resources;

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105. Decision 3/CMA.1.

106. Decision 4/CP.24.

107. Decision 5/CP.24

108. For further information, see [online] <https://www.greenclimate.fund/how-we-work/resource-mobilization/replenishment#introduction>

109. Decision B23/03, see [online] [https://www.greenclimate.fund/documents/20182/1674504/GCF\\_B.23\\_23\\_-\\_Decisions\\_of\\_the\\_Board\\_\\_twenty-third\\_meeting\\_of\\_the\\_Board\\_\\_6\\_\\_8\\_July\\_2019.pdf/de0260d1-736f-0dbf-695c-06684f805ad9](https://www.greenclimate.fund/documents/20182/1674504/GCF_B.23_23_-_Decisions_of_the_Board__twenty-third_meeting_of_the_Board__6__8_July_2019.pdf/de0260d1-736f-0dbf-695c-06684f805ad9) (Agenda item 8(b)).

110. Decision 6/CP.24

- invited the GEF to enhance the information in its reports to the COP on the outcomes of the collaboration between the climate technology transfer and financing centre of the Poznan strategic programme and the CTCN;

## **Biennial budget (2020-2021) of the UNFCCC Secretariat**

The budget for the Secretariat does not cease to be important. The Parties are indeed pushing to see their priorities (committee meetings, technical analyses, regional workshops, etc.) included in the basic budget, which depends on firm contributions, not in the additional budget, which depends on voluntary contributions. During the 50th session of subsidiary bodies, held in June 2019, the Parties considered several versions of the draft biennial budget 2020-2021 for the Convention Secretariat. The draft SBI conclusions on this matter<sup>111</sup> recommend that the COP, at its 25th session, approve a budget-basic programme of €59,847,785, whilst noting the concern of the subsidiary body over the huge amount of arrears in contributions to this budget.

## **VI.4. Financing in the PA Rulebook**

### ***Global climate finance goal***

In Decision 14/CMA.1 relating to *setting a new collective quantified goal on finance in accordance with decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 53*, the CMA:

- decided to initiate at its third session (November 2020) deliberations on setting a new collective quantified goal from a floor of USD 100 billion per year; and
- agreed to consider the aim to strengthen the global response to climate change in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty<sup>112</sup>.

### ***Transparency of ex-ante financing (Article 9.5 of the PA):***

Article 9.5 of the PA makes it mandatory for developed country Parties to communicate every two years indicative, quantitative and qualitative information, related to paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 9 of the PA. In Decision 12/CMA.1, the CMA:

- reiterates that the developed country Parties must submit their first biennial communications, as specified in the Annex to the Decision<sup>113</sup>, starting in 2020;

<sup>111</sup>. FCCC/SBI/2019/L.2

<sup>112</sup>. IISD, 2018c.

<sup>113</sup>. Decision 12/CMA.1

- requests the Secretariat (i) to establish a dedicated online portal for posting and recording the biennial communications, (ii) to prepare, starting in 2021, a compilation and synthesis of information included in the biennial communications, to inform the global stocktake and (iii) organise in-session workshops every two years, beginning the year after the submission of the first biennial communications, and to prepare subsequently a summary report on the work of each workshop. These various reports and summaries will be considered by the CMA at its fourth session (November 2021);
- decides to convene a biennial high-level ministerial dialogue on climate finance beginning in 2021, with a summary to be prepared by the Chair of the CMA for consideration by the CMA at its next sessions;
- decides to consider updating the types of information contained in the Annex to the Decision at its sixth session (CMA 6, November/December 2023).

***Transparency of ex-post financing (accounting modalities for financial resources provided and mobilised through public interventions)***

Article 9.7 of the PA makes it mandatory for developed country Parties to communicate (ex-post) the information on financial resources provided and mobilised through public interventions for the benefit of developing countries. The Parties agreed to initiate methodological discussions and negotiations on the following items<sup>114</sup>:

- Common reporting tables for the reporting of the information in the NIR on GHG anthropogenic emissions and absorptions;
- Common tabular formats for the electronic reporting of information required to monitor progress made in the implementation of NDC under Article 4 of the PA;
- Common tabular formats for the electronic reporting of information on the financial support provided and mobilised and the support necessary and received for the development and transfer of technologies and for capacity-building;
- Outlines of the BTR, NIR and technical expert review (TER);
- A training programme for the aforementioned experts.

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114. Decision 18/CMA.1

## VII. Transparency

### **General overview of the progress of the negotiations on the operationalisation of the ETF**

The modalities, procedures and guidelines (MPG) of the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF)<sup>115</sup> were finalised and adopted at COP24, establishing the ETF as a reporting and review process based on the existing transparency modalities under the Convention and the KP. Starting from 2024, the Parties will be required to submit biennial transparency reports (BTR) that report on the national GHG emission inventories from the national inventory reports (NIR), progress toward the objectives of their NDC and the financing provided and mobilised, as well as the financing that is required and received for the developing country Parties. The main issue in the operationalisation of the MPG is to define the transparency provisions that all of the Parties have agreed upon, whilst acknowledging the need for flexibility in developing countries. It remains especially to define or settle how to apply the provisions for flexibility in the NIR, NDC or the financing supplied and mobilised and to develop the reporting tables, including some based on existing tabular formats.

### **VII.1. Transparency in the context of negotiations**

Transparency has been an issue in the negotiations ever since the creation of the Convention. A differentiated framework between the developing country and industrialised country Parties has been set up through national communications (NC) on mitigation, by virtue of Article 12.1 of the Convention. Under the PK the reporting obligations were strengthened for industrialised country Parties<sup>116</sup>. In particular, this included the annual submission of NIR and information showing compliance with their objectives under the protocol. Since 2003, these reports have been subject to a Technical Expert Review (TER). Non-Annex I Parties are subject to less stringent reporting requirements: the NC submission deadlines are not as strict and the report is intended to be less detailed and covers fewer domains.

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115. Decision 18/CMA.1.


116. Decisions 4/CP.5, 22/CP.7, 17/CP.8.



The 2010 Cancún Agreements made it possible to strengthen these initial provisions. The Parties committed to sharing information every two years on policies and measures implemented to combat climate change, based on their specific circumstances<sup>117</sup>. This framework implemented since 2014 has three different stages: Reporting, national technical assessment of reports submitted and peer-to-peer exchanges covering progress by the country.

Article 13 of the Paris Agreement and the accompanying Decision 1/CP.21 stipulate the establishment of an enhanced transparency framework (ETF). This is a crucial tool for implementing the PA as it must enable the monitoring of the advances and progress made regarding the individual objectives defined in the NDC and in terms of the collective objectives of Parties by virtue of the PA. It must also incorporate the transactions implemented under the market mechanisms defined in Article 6 of the PA and avoid double counting of emissions reductions.

### Evolution of the provisions related to transparency<sup>118</sup>



The Modalities, Procedures and Guidelines (MPG) of the ETF (Decision 18/CRA.1) were adopted at the close of COP24. With the adoption of the MPG, the process of making the ETF operational started by developing the reporting formats, as the negotiations pertaining to the modalities ensure flexibility for developing countries. COP24 gave SBSTA the mandate to draw up drafts for common reporting formats by virtue of the different MPG sections. The negotiations at the 50th session of the SBSTA (June 2019) resulted in draft conclusions<sup>119</sup> that note

117. Decision 1/CP.16

118. © Guide to the negotiations of COP25-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2019 According to UNFCCC, 2018a.

119. UNFCCC 2019: FCCC/SBSTA/2019/L.3 [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sbsta2019\\_L03E.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sbsta2019_L03E.pdf)

the support to provide to developing countries and the different possibilities for including the flexibility provisions. The draft conclusions also note that the current measuring, reporting and verification system is a good “starting point”<sup>120</sup> for developing common formats. The decision refers to four informal notes which will form the basis for consideration at COP25.

## VII.2. Modalities, Procedures and Guidelines adopted at Katowice

The MPG reflect certain fundamental principles of the transparency framework:

1. The MPG are based on the existing reporting requirements, with the BTR replacing the BR required under the KP. The Parties will continue to submit NC. The (annual) submission of NIR is maintained for industrialised country Parties and henceforth also applies to developing country Parties, but on a biennial basis, however.
2. The MPG contain flexibility provisions for developing country Parties that need it, considering their capacities. The decision acknowledges the need to include flexibility provisions regarding the scope, frequency and level of detail of the review of the reports under the ETF and the responsibility of determining and justifying their need for flexibility is incumbent on the Parties. Specific flexibility provisions apply to the LDC and SIDS.
3. The MPG provide for the future development and improvement of the Convention’s transparency arrangements. In their BTR and NIR, the Parties are required to include the fields in which a improvement of the transparency process is planned, as well as how these improvements may be incorporated.

The first BTR should be submitted before 31 December 2024 and included four components<sup>121</sup>:

- An NIR based on the 2006 IPCC recommendations and the global warming potentials (GWP) of its fifth assessment report.
- A description of the NDC of the Party and of the progress in achieving it, including information on the national circumstances that impact the implementation. The MPG provide for flexibility provisions for developing countries that need it in light of their capacities, particularly regarding forecasting methodologies.
- A section on adaptation, divided into eight sub-sections; reporting on adaptation is not however mandatory and can be communicated in a timely fashion.

120. UNFCCC 2019: FCCC/SBSTA/2019/L.3 [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sbsta2019\\_L03E.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sbsta2019_L03E.pdf)

121. Decision 18/CRA.1

- The support for financing, for technology development and transfer and for capacity-building. The industrialised countries, as well as the developing countries to which it is applicable, must report on the support that is provided and mobilised. Developing countries must report on the support that is required and received.

The BTR of all Parties are subject to a Technical Expert Review (TER) conducted by a team of experts chosen by the Secretariat. The scope of the TER covers the review of the coherence of the information submitted in the BTR, the implementation of implementation execution of the NDC, the support provided and the areas of improvement. For the developing country Parties that need it, the TER will also consider the need for support in determining the capacity-building needs. The review does not cover the adequacy of relevancy of the NDC, national actions or the support provided. Simplified version will take place in the non-BTR years consisting of a verification of the NIR by the Secretariat. At the same time as the TER process, the CRT provides for consideration that facilitates progress in a multilateral fashion. This process offers all Parties the opportunities to comment the TER report of a Party prior to the COP.

### VII.3. Operationalisation of the MPG at COP25

The work on the operationalisation of MPG has started on the four MPG components. The negotiations in this respect will continue at COP25.

- a. Common tabular format (CTF) for National Inventory Reports (NIR):** The Parties considered the existing tables as the starting point for drawing up the CTF for the NIR. The discussions covered additional reporting elements, as well as rendering the flexibility operational in the CTF. A few Parties requested further information on the reporting software that is currently used, to use it and potentially update it in supporting new notification tables. It was also acknowledged that capacity-building support is essential for facilitating the reporting process.
- b. Common table templates for the electronic reporting of information required for monitoring the progress accomplished in implementing and obtaining NDC:** The reporting requirements of industrialised country Parties in the context of the NC were considered as the starting point<sup>122</sup>. The Parties discussed the adjustments required to ensure alignment with the MPG, as well as for the inclusion of flexibility provisions.

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122. Informal note: [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/SBSTA50.IN\\_i10b\\_0.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/SBSTA50.IN_i10b_0.pdf)

- c. **CTF for the electronic reporting of information for the financial support provided and mobilised and the support needed and received**: an informal note<sup>123</sup> specifies that the CTF of the RB that the Annex I countries currently use may be used as a starting point for the CTF for the support provided in terms of financing, technology and capacity-building. However, the tabular formats for the mobilised support, as well as for the support needed and received, need to be developed. The Parties considered the flexibility for developing countries, as well as options for training and capacity-building.
- d. An informal note<sup>124</sup> proposes **structures for the BTR, the NIR and the TER report**.

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123. Informal note: [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/SBSTA50.IN\\_i10c.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/SBSTA50.IN_i10c.pdf)

124. See [online] [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/SBSTA50.IN\\_i10d\\_0.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/SBSTA50.IN_i10d_0.pdf)

# VIII. Capacity-building

## VIII.1. Capacity-building in the Paris Agreement

Article 11 of the PA emphasises the importance of building the capacity of developing country Parties. The objective is to allow them to take effective climate change actions, particularly via the implementation of adaptation and mitigation actions, so as to facilitate “*technology development, dissemination and deployment, access to climate finance, relevant aspects of education, training and public awareness and the transparent, timely and accurate communication of information*”<sup>125</sup>. Although the capacity-building should be driven by the countries themselves, by incorporating national circumstances and needs, Article 11 highlights the international cooperation that targets this objective. It indicates that all of the Parties should cooperate (and that industrialised countries should provide support) to build capacity in developing countries under the implementation of the PA.

## VIII.2. Principles enshrined in the Convention

In the framework of international climate action, capacity-building initiatives recognise that developing countries as well as transition economies (a term that should be placed in the context of the 1990s) cannot take ambitious action, whether it be for adaptation or mitigation, without addressing the gaps and the deficiencies identified as limitations for formulating and implementing them. Article 6 of the Convention concerns education and public awareness. The provisions of this article<sup>126</sup> stipulate:

- training scientific, technical and management staff; and
- using cooperation to reach the objectives stated in the Article and pursuant to the Convention<sup>127</sup>.

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125. Article 11.1 of the Paris Agreement

126. By additionally supporting the “Commitments” of the Parties under Article 4, paragraph 1(i) of the Convention, which provides that the Parties *by their cooperation, encourage and support education, training and public awareness of climate change and encourage the broadest participation in this process notably in terms of non-government organisations*”.

127. See [online] <https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/convfr.pdf>

Since the adoption of the Convention, capacity-building has been an essential part of the negotiation process. In addition to addressing this issue transversally within other themes (for example, as part of the preparation of the national communications, GHG inventories, technology transfer and adaptation) and also as a topic in its own right. The negotiation rounds first resulted in the implementation of a capacity-building framework which then evolved into its current form.

### VIII.3. Capacity-building framework under the Kyoto Protocol

Article 10 of the KP specifies that the capacity for research, education and training of executives in developing countries should be strengthened. However, the development of a framework structured around the capacity-building has taken over a decade. COP7 (Marrakesh, 2001), in its Decision 2/CP.7 on developing countries and in its Decision 3/CP.7 on transition economies, established a capacity-building framework under the Convention and the KP. These decisions identified the principles that should guide the capacity-building actions piloted by the countries, which particularly aim to respond to their specific needs, whilst making it possible to reflect their national priorities, initiatives and strategies in terms of sustainable development. These same decisions highlighted that capacity-building activities should intensify the synergies between the Convention and other multilateral environmental agreements

### VIII.4. Durban Forum

An important step was made at COP17 (Durban, 2011) when the Parties entrusted the SBI with the mission “*to further enhance the monitoring and review of the effectiveness of capacity-building by organizing an annual in-session Durban Forum for in-depth discussion on capacity-building with the participation of Parties, representatives of the relevant bodies established under the Convention [...] with a view to sharing their experiences and exchanging ideas, best practices and lessons learned regarding the implementation of capacity-building activities*”<sup>128</sup>.

The Durban Forum is an annual event, held jointly at the Bonn intersession negotiations and is open to all participants. The general objectives of the Forum are to<sup>129</sup>:

- fill information gaps;
- provide an overview of the type of capacity-building support provided to developing countries and the corresponding implementation efforts made by the Parties; and

128. Decision 2/CP.17, para. 144; see also FCCC/SBI/2012/22

129. Durban Forum capacity-building webpage [online] <https://unfccc.int/topics/capacity-building/workstreams/durban-forum-on-capacity-building>

- improve the monitoring and review of the effectiveness of the capacity-building process implemented by the international climate change regime framework.

This Forum has met seven times since May 2012 and does not have a budget or an institutionalised form of governance<sup>130</sup>. The main objective of its last session, held in June 2019, was to improve the capacities of the institutions at the national level in implementing NDC in developing countries. The main subjects were: (i) the role of academia and research institutions; (ii) enhancing coherence and coordination amongst the different stakeholders in capacity-building support; and (iii) best practices available for assessing the impact and effectiveness of capacity-building activities<sup>131</sup>.

## VIII.5. Capacity-building under the Paris Agreement

### The Paris Committee on Capacity-building (PCCB)

The Paris Committee on Capacity-building (PCCB) was established by COP21 to compensate for the gaps in the new and emerging needs in capacity-building implementation in developing countries. It also aims to improve efforts in this field, including coherence and coordination in capacity-building pursuant to the Convention. Decision 1/CP.21<sup>132</sup> requested the SBI elaborate the mandate of the PCCB within the context of the third full revision of the implementation of the capacity-building framework in developing countries, in order to recommend a draft proposal on the issue to be reviewed and adopted by COP22. At the end of COP22, the mandate of the PCCB was adopted and the COP requested the PCCB to specify and adopt its working modalities and procedures at its first meeting, which was held at the 46th session of subsidiary bodies (May 2017)<sup>133</sup>. To achieve these set objectives, the PCCB is composed of four working groups<sup>134</sup>.

### Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency (CBIT)

Paragraph 84 of Decision 1/CP.21 rendered official the establishment of a **Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency (CBIT)** with the objective of supporting developing country Parties in developing their institutional and technical capacities. The GEF is responsible for supporting the establishment and continuation of the

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130. Durban Forum capacity-building webpage [online] <https://unfccc.int/topics/capacity-building/workstreams/durban-forum-on-capacity-building>.

131. 8th Durban Forum on Capacity-building: key messages [online] <https://unfccc.int/8th-durban-forum>

132. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 76.

133. Decision 9/CP.7, Decision 16/CP.22 and Decision 6/CMP.12.

134. See [online] <https://unfccc.int/pccb/pccb-working-groups>

CBIT, particularly by allocating voluntary contributions to it. In its report to the 24th session of the COP, the GEF reported that the total budget of the CBIT as of 30 June 2018 was USD61.1 million from the commitment of fourteen countries, USD56 million of which had already been paid<sup>135</sup>.

The objective of the Global Coordination Platform (GCP) of the CBIT<sup>136</sup> is to exchange information on CBIT projects across the different countries, maximise learning opportunities and strengthen coordination between actors working on transparency via an online platform. All developing country Parties are eligible for the CBIT. On 23 October 2019, the platform contained 32 validated concept notes, eight approved projects and seventeen projects in progress<sup>137</sup>.

Decision 18/CMA.1 relating to the *Modalities, procedures and guidelines for purposes of the transparency framework for action and support referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement*, recognised that the PCCB would continue to support institutional and technical capacity-building in developing country Parties who may request it, prior to and after 2020. Likewise, the GEF was requested to continue to support the PCCB regarding the priority need of drawing up reports<sup>138</sup>.

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135. GEF, 2018b.

136. GEF, 2018c.

137. See [online] <https://www.cbitplatform.org/>

138. Decision 18/CMA.1.



# IX. Transfer of technologies

## IX.1. Background information

The issue of the development and the transfer of mitigation technologies is at the heart of the negotiation agenda and of the actions taken by the UNFCCC since its adoption in 1992. This arises from Article 4 of the Convention in particular, which enshrined the importance of technological cooperation in mitigating climate change<sup>139</sup> in general, as well as the support that developing countries require to develop and transfer “ecologically rational” climate change technologies<sup>140</sup> in particular. Article 4.8 broadens the scope to include adaptation, but it was not until several years later that the negotiations were to specifically address this issue.

At COP7<sup>141</sup> in 2001, the Parties decided to establish:

- the transfer technology framework to include five key topics: (i) the assessment of technological needs, (ii) information on technologies, (iii) the favourable framework for technology transfer, (iv) capacity-building (v) the mechanism for technology transfer;
- the Expert group on technology transfer (EGIT) to facilitate the operationalisation of the Framework was thus created.

For the first time, the financial support for technology transfer for adaptation was specifically mentioned<sup>142</sup>, with the need for climate institutions such as the GEF and the FSCC to increase funding for adaptation.

In 2008, the Parties created the Poznan strategic programme on technology transfer (PSP)<sup>143</sup>, which was the culmination of the strategic reflections and work meetings held by the EGTT. Since its creation in 2007<sup>144</sup>, the PSP has enabled 85 developing countries to draw up their technology needs assessment report.

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139. UNFCCC, Art. 4, para. 1(c).

140. UNFCCC, art. 4, para. 5.

141. Decision 4/CP.7, Annex

142. Decision 5/CP.7.

143. Decision 4/CP.13.

144. Data on the EBT project: <http://unfccc.int/ttclear/tna>.

At SBI 50 (June 2019), the chair proposed draft conclusions including<sup>145</sup>:

- The invitation addressed to the CTCN and TEC to include in their 2019 joint annual report information on how they will respond to the key messages and relevant recommendations in the assessment of the PSP;
- The decision to examine the recommendations in the PSP report at SBI 51 in December 2019;
- The request to the Secretariat to prepare a synthesis report on the technology needs.

Following Decision 1/CP.21 para. 67(a-d), SBI began to elaborate the Technology Framework, which mainly aims to provide orientations and general guidelines for the technology mechanism of the Convention. Based on the compilation of the viewpoints of the Parties<sup>146</sup> and the information note mapping technology transfer initiatives and activities<sup>147</sup>, at SBSTA 45 (November 2016, Marrakesh), the Parties concluded that there is a need to enhance synergies with the initiatives under way to be able to effectively contribute to the operationalisation of the technology mechanism of the Convention.

Furthermore, the Parties considered that this technology framework could play a key role in the dynamics of transferring sustainable and transformational technologies, as defined in Article 10, paragraphs 1 and 4 of the PA. Aware of the many issues that were clearly identified and highlighted during the informal consultations, SBSTA 45 concluded on the five themes that constitute the aforementioned framework: innovation; implementation; favourable conditions and capacity-building; the collaboration and commitment of stakeholders; and support.

With the same perspective, the communications of Parties<sup>148</sup> and observers<sup>149</sup>, as well as various exchanges, enabled the co-facilitators of SBSTA 46 (May 2017, Bonn) to agree on the principles of the framework, which are coherence, inclusion, outcome-based approach, transformational approach and transparency.

145. FCCC/SBI/2019/L.6.


146. FCCC/SBSTA/L.8

147. FCCC/SBSTA/2016/INF.9 and Corr.1.

148. See [online] <http://unfccc.int/5900>.

149. See [online] <http://unfccc.int/7482>.

## Principles of the Technology Framework<sup>150</sup>



## IX.2. Technology framework under the PA and the issues of COP25

At the end of COP24, a decision could be adopted on the technology framework under paragraph 4 of Article 10 of the PA, within which the CMA<sup>151</sup>:

- Adopts the technology framework defined in an annex structured into three sections: (i) the purpose, (ii) the principles and (iii) the key themes.
- Decides that the implementation of implementation technology framework should be the responsibility of the TEC and CTCN, in collaboration with CMA management;
- Requests the TEC and CTCN: (a) in their respective programmes and work plans to incorporate the guidance contained in the technology framework and to have these include the methods for monitoring and evaluating their activities as well and; (b) for their 2019 joint annual report to include information on how the directives of the technology framework were integrated in the work plans and programmes;
- Reiterates the importance of providing support to developing countries;
- Decides that the outcomes and/or recommendations resulting from the periodic assessment of the technology mechanism will be reviewed when the technology framework is updated;

150. © Guide to the negotiations of COP25-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2019

151. Decision 15/CMA.1.

- Requests the secretariat to facilitate the implementation of the technology framework and that the activities planned by the secretariat to be subject to the availability of financial resources.

The same decision states also the actions and activities for the implementation of the technology framework<sup>152</sup>:


- Facilitate the execution and updating of technology needs assessments, stimulate the implementation of their outcomes, especially technology action plans and project ideas and ensure capacity-building in assessing technology needs;
- Stimulate the alignment of the technology needs assessments with the NDC and NAP to increase the coherence of the national plans implemented and the national strategies;
- Update and review the guidelines relating to the technology needs assessments as much as necessary, to ensure that they will lead to plans and measures that are compatible with the changes envisaged in the PA;
- Prepare recommendations:
  - On the assessment of technologies ready for transfer;
  - To overcome the obstacles and create environments that allow the development and transfer of technologies that are socially and economically rational.

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152. Ibid.

# X. Loss and damage

General typologies of approaches for responding to loss and damage<sup>153</sup>



Loss and damage has become a central issue in the negotiations and aims to provide answers, especially in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable, to the impacts that can not be avoided by either a reduction in GHG emissions or by introduction of adaptation strategies. Aware of the need to enhance international skills and cooperation to understand and reduce loss and damage, COP16

153. © Guide to the negotiations of COP25-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2019 Adapted from UNFCCC, 2019c.

in Cancun in 2010<sup>154</sup> decided to prepare a work programme devoted to this theme. The Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) for Loss and Damage, whose implementation is supervised by an executive committee (ExCom), was established at COP19 in November 2013<sup>155</sup>. The role of ExCom is to address the issue of loss and prejudice in a full, integrated and coherent manner under the COP. The first biennial work programme and organisation of the WIM ExCom were approved at the end of COP20 in Lima in December 2014.

## **X.1. Loss and damage in the Paris Agreement**

Loss and Damage are rooted in the Paris Agreement via a dedicated article (Article 8), even if it is acknowledged that this article may not give rise to or serve as a basis for any liability or compensation<sup>156</sup>. The WIM is under the authority of the CMA, follows its directives and may then be enhanced according to its decisions.

Decision 1/CP.21 asked the WIM to establish a clearing house for risk transfer and to create a task force to develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert and minimise population displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change<sup>157</sup>. COP22 was able to review the WIM and establish a number of recommendations<sup>158</sup>.

At COP23 in 2017, the five-year ExCom workplan starting from 2018 was approved<sup>159</sup>, with a review of its first two years of activities planned around five activity areas<sup>160</sup>. COP23 also saw the launch of a Fiji clearing house for risk transfer<sup>161</sup>, that aims to serve as an information platform on risk insurance and transfer.

## **X.2. WIM review in Madrid**

The annual ExCom report was presented at the COP24 plenary on 2 December 2018. The informal consultations mainly concerned this report and its recommendations<sup>162</sup>

154. Decision 1/CP.16.

155. Decision 2/CP.19.

156. Decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 51

157. Decision 1/CP.21, paras. 48 and 99

158. Decisions 3/CP.22 and 4/CP.22

159. Decision 3/CP.22, paragraph 3

160. UNFCCC, 2019d.

161. See [online] <http://unfccc-clearinghouse.org/>

162. IISD, 2018c.

## Recommendations of the 2018 WIM ExCom report<sup>163</sup>



In keeping with the decisions made at COP22, in June 2019, the UNFCCC Secretariat published its technical document on the *elaboration of the sources of and modalities for accessing financial support for addressing loss and damage*<sup>164</sup>. This document was presented at the 50th session of subsidiary bodies in Bonn in June 2019, during which the reference revision framework for the WIM was finally adopted<sup>165</sup>. The topic should once more be at the heart of the COP25 debates<sup>166</sup>.

163. © Guide to the negotiations of COP25-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2019 According to FCCC/SB/2018/1 and the WIM ExCom report [online] <https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/1f.pdf>

164. UNFCCC, 2019c and FCCC/TP/2019/1

165. FCCC/SB/2019/L.3, See [online] [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sb\\_2019\\_L.03F.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sb_2019_L.03F.pdf)

166. Carbon brief, 2019.

# XI. Gender and climate change

Agenda 21, adopted in Rio in 1992, had already identified women as one of the “*major groups*” of civil society, playing a vital role in achieving sustainable development<sup>167</sup>.

Under the auspices of the UNFCCC, at COP7 in 2001 in Marrakesh, the Parties put forward the need to have a more balanced representation of men and women amongst the elected members of the bodies created under the Convention and the KP<sup>168</sup>. At COP17, the Secretariat was asked to include the application of gender-sensitive methods and tools<sup>169</sup> in the cross-cutting issues, within the framework of the Nairobi work programme on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to this climate change.

One year later (COP18 in Doha) in 2012, the Parties decided to enhance Decision 36/CP.7<sup>170</sup> made at Marrakesh, “*adopting a goal of gender balance in bodies established pursuant to the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, in order to improve women’s participation and inform more effective climate change policy that addresses the needs of women and men equally*”<sup>171</sup>.

As such, the Convention Secretariat is in particular asked to keep up-to-date information on the gender composition of bodies created by virtue of the Convention or the KP<sup>172</sup> and to communicate these data annually to the COP for consideration. In 2014 (COP20), Lima biennial work programme on gender was established<sup>173</sup>, with the objective of conducting its review at COP22<sup>174</sup> and of taking “*any necessary action needed to strengthen the progress of furthering these goals*”<sup>175</sup>.

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167. United Nations, 1992 Agenda 21, Chapter 23

168. Decision 36/CP.7

169. Decision 6/CP.17

170. Decision 36/CP.7 on improving the participation of women in the representation of Parties in the bodies established under the Convention or the Kyoto Protocol.

171. Decision 23/CP.18, para 2.

172. Decision 23/CP.18, para 8.

173. Decision 18/CP.20, Preamble.

174. *See the above*, “The continuation of work on gender and gender equality after the outcomes of Paris”

175. Decision 18/CP.20, para. 16.



## **XI.1. Gender equality in the Paris Agreement**

The text of the PA, replaces the term “gender” with the term “gender equality”, to ensure recognition of the necessary equal involvement of women and men in combating climate change at all levels. Decision 1/CP.21 includes the theme of gender equality and empowerment of women by “*acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind and that “Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on [...] gender equality empowerment of women and intergenerational equity*”<sup>176</sup>.

In Article 7 of the Agreement, which establishes the global adaptation goal, “*The Parties acknowledge that adaptation action should follow a country-driven, gender-responsive, participatory and fully transparent approach, taking into consideration vulnerable groups, communities and ecosystems*”<sup>177</sup>. Finally, Article 11, which addresses capacity-building must “*be guided by lessons learned, including those from capacity-building activities under the Convention and should be an effective, iterative process that is participatory, cross-cutting and gender-responsive*”<sup>178</sup>.

## **XI.2. Work on gender since COP21**

The assessment of the Lima Work Programme on Gender<sup>179</sup> took place at COP22, where a day specifically devoted to the subject was also organised<sup>180</sup>. After this conferences the Lima Work Programme was enhanced and extended for three years, with a new review placed on the agenda of COP25 in December 2019<sup>181</sup>. Following the proceedings conducted under the aegis of SBI 47 and pursuant to paragraph 27 of Decision 21/CP.22, COP23 adopted a decision for the “*establishment of a gender action plan*”<sup>182</sup>, which is in the annex of the Lima Work Programme on Gender. Regarding monitoring the progress made in the implementation of the gender action plan, the COP asked the Secretariat to draw up a synthesis report, to be considered by the SBI at its session in December 2019<sup>183</sup>, to prepare recommendations that the COP could examine at its 25th session<sup>184</sup>.

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176. Decision 1/CP.21.

177. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 7, para. 5.

178. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 11, para. 1

179. Decision 18/CP.20, para. 16.

180. See [online] [http://unfccc.int/gender\\_and\\_climate\\_change/items/9948.php](http://unfccc.int/gender_and_climate_change/items/9948.php).

181. Decision 21/CP.22 para. 6.

182. Decision 3/CP.23.

183. Decision 3/CP.23, para. 5.

184. Decision 3/CP.23, para. 7.

The climate conference at Katowice in December 2018 saw no major progress on these matters. The activities conducted in 2018 were presented by the Secretariat during informal consultations. In its conclusions, the SBI recalled that<sup>185</sup> thus far, only 42 Parties have named a contact point who is a gender specialist and encouraged Parties to submit information on the implementation of the action plan for gender equality by 31 August 2019. The Secretariat was to use this information to produce a synthesis that will be considered at the 51st SBI session in Madrid.

At its 50th session in June 2019 COP also requested the SBI to review the progress accomplished, levers for improvement and future work to conduct under the Lima work programme on gender and the action plan for gender equality, to be submitted for consideration and adoption at COP25<sup>186</sup>. Ultimately, the inter-session made it possible to adopt an informal note produced by the co-facilitators, which details the viewpoints expressed by the Parties.

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185. FCCC/SBI/2018/L.22

186. IISD, 2018c.


# XII. Agriculture and food security in the negotiations

## XII.1. Background

According to the IPCC report on climate change and land – a summary for

policymakers was published in August 2019 –, the shares of agriculture and land use, land-use change and forestry in global anthropogenic emissions of CO<sub>2</sub>, methane (CH<sub>4</sub>) and nitrous oxide (N<sub>2</sub>O) in the decade 2007-2016 are respectively 13%, 44% and 82%, i.e. about 23% of total GHG anthropogenic emissions at 12 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq per year. More than half of these estimated net emissions are linked to agriculture, at 6.2 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq per year<sup>187</sup>. The sector, on which the majority of poor populations depend for their livelihood, is also extremely vulnerable to climate disorders.

IPCC Report on climate change and land<sup>188</sup>



187. IPCC, 2019a.

188. © Guide to the negotiations of COP25-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2019

## XII.2. Inclusion of agricultural matters in the negotiations

In 2008, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) started to include agriculture matters in its work, a process that led the COP to request the SBSTA, following COP17 in Durban in 2011, to consider these questions as allowing an exchange of views between the Parties<sup>189</sup>. The outcomes of this exchange phase led the Parties to recommend a draft decision at the end of SBSTA 47 for consideration and adoption at COP23 in Bonn in November 2017. There, the Parties adopted the joint work programme (between SBI and SBSTA) entitled “**Koronivia joint work on agriculture**”. The two subsidiary bodies were also asked to report on progress made and outcomes reached in this area at COP26 (November 2020)<sup>190</sup>. At the end of SB 48, the Parties adopted a two-year road map to operationalise the Koronivia joint work programme on agriculture, which will be concluded at the 53rd sessions of the SBSTA and SBI (November 2020).

### Koronivia Road Map<sup>191</sup>



189. Decision 2/CP.17.

190. Decision 4/CP.23, para. 4.

191. © Guide to the negotiations of COP25-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2019 From SBSTA [online] <https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/4e.pdf>

The conclusion of the SBI and SBSTA at their 49th session (December 2018, Katowice)<sup>192</sup> welcomed the first in-session workshop from the Koronivia road map on topic 2(s), invited the financial entities (GEF, GCF, AF, LDCF and SCCF) to attend the planned workshops, whilst agreeing to continue the work at the Bonn intersession in June 2019. Two workshops on topics 2(b) and 2(c) were organised during this session (SB50). The draft joint conclusions of the two bodies requests the Secretariat to organise an additional workshop between the 51st and 52nd sessions of the SBI and SBSTA to consider sustainable land and water management, as well as strategies and modalities to scale up practices and technologies to increase resilience and sustainable production<sup>193</sup>.

The 51st session of the SBI and the SBSTA (Madrid, December 2019) should continue, through workshops and meetings of experts, to consider agriculture-related issues, in collaboration with the bodies constituted under the Convention and by incorporating the particular vulnerabilities of the sector along with the approaches to food security. A workshop will be organised on topic 2(d)<sup>194</sup> and the reports of the workshops on topics 2(b) and 2(c) will be reviewed.

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192. FCCC/SB/2018/L.7

193. FCCC/SB/2019/L.2.

194. See [online] <https://unfccc.int/topics/land-use/workstreams/agriculture>

# XIII. Involvement of non-Party entities in the negotiations

## XIII.1. Observer groups under the Convention


Non-Party entities can be accredited by the Convention to attend the negotiating sessions (COP and intersessions) as observers under different banners<sup>195</sup>: These organisations (2,200 NGO and 130 international organisations during COP24) can access the negotiating area and attend open meetings, mainly opening and closing plenary sessions and meetings of contact groups working on specific themes (unless two-thirds of the Parties present at the conference object or the Session Chair decides to close the session). Conversely, they infrequently have access to informal consultations<sup>196</sup>. Although they have no official say in the decisions made by the COP, CMA or CMP, the observer entities have nevertheless seen their influence increase year on year in the negotiations, supported by extensive mobilisation of the civil society and by different processes.

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195. See [online] <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/parties-non-party-stakeholders/non-party-stakeholders/overview> .

196. See [online] [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/COP24\\_observer\\_guide.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/COP24_observer_guide.pdf) .

## Evolution of the involvement of non-Party entities in the negotiations<sup>197</sup>



## XIII.2. Results of the Talanoa Dialogue

During COP21 in Paris in December 2015, the COP decided to organise a facilitation dialogue in 2018 to take stock of collective efforts by Parties towards achieving the long-term goal referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the PA and inform the NDC development process in 2020, in accordance with paragraph 8 of Article 4<sup>198</sup>. This dialogue constitutes a key instrument serving enhanced ambition in the current negotiating and global climate action cycle. One year later, the Presidencies of COP22 and COP23 were mandated to undertake open and transparent consultations with the Parties on organising this facilitation dialogue<sup>199</sup>. The outcomes of these consultations were presented at COP23 (Bonn, November 2017), based on which the approach was made available to all Parties. Renamed the Talanoa Dialogue, the process is thus structured around three questions<sup>200</sup>: Where are we? Where do we want to go? How do we get there?

197. © Guide to the negotiations of COP25–Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2019 Adapted from GGCA (2017)

198. Decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 20.

199. Decision 1/CP.22, paragraph 16.

200. Talanoa Dialogue – Annex II to Decision 1/CP.23.

Launched in January 2018<sup>201</sup>, the Dialogue is divided into two phases – “technical” and “political” – and is open to non-Party stakeholders, giving them the opportunity to submit their views to the Secretariat and also to attend various discussion forums. The Bonn intersession in May 2018 and COP24 in December 2018 in Katowice were the high spots of these two phases. The Secretariat acted as facilitator in support of the presidencies of COP23 and COP24, mainly moderating a specific online platform<sup>202</sup>.

The preparatory phase was completed during a plenary meeting on 6 December 2018. The political phase opened on 11 December and closed on 12 December. Its purpose was to take stock of collective efforts by Parties in making progress towards achieve the long-term objective of the PA and to shed light on the preparation of NDC. Twenty-one key messages from the Talanoa Dialogue were compiled in a single document, published on 12 December and available on the specific website<sup>203</sup>. The Talanoa Dialogue ultimately resulted in a call for action being drafted by the Presidents of COP23 and COP24<sup>204</sup>, around five precepts and objectives<sup>205</sup>.

Call for action from the Talanoa Dialogue<sup>206</sup>

### XIII.3. Progress made by the Marrakesh Partnership

The Marrakesh Partnership was launched by the High-level Champions for Climate in 2016 following COP22 to “provide a solid road map on how the UNFCCC process will catalyse and revitalise climate action by the Parties and non-Party stakeholders during the period 2017-2020”<sup>207</sup>. Its main task is to strengthen the collaboration between Parties and non-Party entities (sub-national authorities, companies, civil society, etc.) to accelerate pre- and post-2020 adaptation and mitigation actions<sup>208</sup>.


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201. Decision 1/CP.23, paragraphs 10-11 and Annex II  
 202. See [online] <https://talanoadialogue.com/>.  
 203. See [online] [https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/9fc76f74-a749-4ecc-9a06-5907e013dbc9/downloads/1cuk3u5r4\\_121115.pdf](https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/9fc76f74-a749-4ecc-9a06-5907e013dbc9/downloads/1cuk3u5r4_121115.pdf)  
 204. See [online] <https://talanoadialogue.com/outputs-and-outcome>  
 205. See [online] [https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/9fc76f74-a749-4ecc-9a06-5907e013dbc9/downloads/1cujutv95\\_183663.pdf](https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/9fc76f74-a749-4ecc-9a06-5907e013dbc9/downloads/1cujutv95_183663.pdf)  
 206. © Guide to the negotiations of COP25-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2019  
 207. See [online] <https://unfccc.int/fr/news/les-acteurs-non-etatiques-et-les-gouvernements-sassocient-pour-stimuler-laction-climatique>.  
 208. See [online] [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/gca\\_approach.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/gca_approach.pdf).



A series of events was organised under the Partnership during COP24, with one devoted to the presentation of the second edition of the Yearbook on climate actions during 2018<sup>209</sup>. Structured around a review of the current global climate action, the vision of this action for the future and means of accelerating the action, this yearbook concludes with a series of key messages, as presented below<sup>210</sup>. Following COP24, the 2019-2020 work programme for the Partnership was adopted, focusing on four objectives, five tools and mechanisms and three key themes

### 2019-2020 work programme for the Marrakesh Partnership<sup>211</sup>



209. Yearbook available [online] [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/GCA\\_Yearbook\\_2018.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/GCA_Yearbook_2018.pdf)

210. Yearbook available [online] [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/GCA\\_Yearbook\\_2018.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/GCA_Yearbook_2018.pdf)

211. © Guide to the negotiations of COP25-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2019 Taken from [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/MPGCA\\_WorkProgramme\\_2019-2020.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/MPGCA_WorkProgramme_2019-2020.pdf)

## Abbreviations and acronyms

French		English	
APEI	Alliance des petits États insulaires	<i>Alliance of Small Island States</i>	<i>AOSIS</i>
AP	Accord de Paris	<i>Paris Agreement</i>	<i>PA</i>
CCNUCC	Convention-cadre des Nations Unies sur les changements climatiques	<i>United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</i>	<i>UNFCCC</i>
CDN	Contribution déterminée au niveau national	<i>Nationally Determined Contributions</i>	<i>NDC</i>
CdP	Conférence des Parties à la Convention-cadre des Nations Unies sur les changements climatiques	<i>Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</i>	<i>COP</i>
CEK	Comité d'experts de Katowice (CEK) sur les impacts de la mise en œuvre des mesures de riposte	<i>Katowice Committee of Experts on Impacts of Implementation of Response Measures</i>	<i>KCI</i>
CET	Comité exécutif de la technologie	<i>Technology Executive Committee</i>	<i>TEC</i>
CFA	Conseil du Fonds pour l'Adaptation	<i>Adaptation Fund Board</i>	<i>AFB</i>
CN	Communications nationales	<i>National Communication</i>	<i>NC</i>
CNA	Cours normal des Affaires	<i>Business as usual</i>	<i>BAU</i>
ComEx	Comité Exécutif du mécanisme international de Varsovie sur les Pertes et préjudices	<i>Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism on loss and damages</i>	<i>ExCom</i>
CPDN	Contribution prévue déterminée au niveau national	<i>Intended Nationally Determined Contribution</i>	<i>INDC</i>
CPF	Comité permanent des Finances	<i>Standing Committee for Finance</i>	<i>SCF</i>
CPRC	Comité de Paris sur le Renforcement des Capacités	<i>Paris Committee on Capacity Building</i>	<i>PCCB</i>
CRA	Conférence des Parties servant en tant que Réunion des Parties de l'Accord de Paris	<i>Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement</i>	<i>CMA</i>
CRP	Conférence des Parties agissant en tant que Réunion des Parties au Protocole de Kyoto	<i>Conference of the Parties serving as Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol</i>	<i>CMP</i>
CRTC	Centre et Réseau des Technologies du Climat	<i>Climate Technology Centre and Network</i>	<i>CTCN</i>
CTR	Cadre de Transparence Renforcé	<i>Enhanced Transparency Framework</i>	<i>ETF</i>
DC	Démarches concertées	<i>Cooperative Approaches</i>	<i>CA</i>
DNM	Démarches non fondées sur les marchés	<i>Non-Market Approaches</i>	<i>NMA</i>
EOD	Entités opérationnelles désignées	<i>Designated Operational Entities</i>	<i>DOE</i>
FA	Fonds pour l'adaptation	<i>Adaptation Fund</i>	<i>AF</i>
FEM	Fonds pour l'Environnement mondial	<i>Global Environment Facility</i>	<i>GEF</i>
FPMA	Fonds des pays les moins avancés	<i>Least Developed Countries Fund</i>	<i>LDCF</i>
FSCC	Fonds spécial des Changements climatiques	<i>Special Climate Change Fund</i>	<i>SCCF</i>
FTC	Formats Tabulaires Communs	<i>Common Reporting Format table</i>	<i>CRF</i>
FVC	Fonds vert pour le climat	<i>Green Climate Fund</i>	<i>GCF</i>

French		English	
GCE	Groupe consultatif d'experts	<i>Consultative Group of experts</i>	<i>CGE</i>
GEMO	Groupe d'États ayant la même optique (ou Pays en développement aux vues similaires)	<i>Like Minded Developing Countries (Like Minded Group)</i>	<i>LMDC (ou LMG)</i>
GEF	Groupe d'Experts sur les pays les moins avancés	<i>Least Developed Country Expert Group</i>	<i>LEG</i>
GES	Gaz à Effet de Serre	<i>Greenhouse Gas</i>	<i>GHG</i>
GETT	Groupe d'Experts pour le Transfert de la Technologie	<i>Expert Group on Technology Transfer</i>	<i>EGTT</i>
GIE	Groupe d'Intégrité Environnementale	<i>Environmental Integrity Group</i>	<i>EIG</i>
GIEC	Groupe intergouvernemental d'Experts sur l'évolution du Climat	<i>Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change</i>	<i>IPCC</i>
GTS-AP	Groupe de Travail spécial pour l'Accord de Paris	<i>Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement</i>	<i>APA</i>
IRCT	Initiative de Renforcement des Capacités pour la Transparence	<i>Capacity building initiative for transparency</i>	<i>CBIT</i>
MDD	Mécanisme pour un Développement durable	<i>Sustainable Development Mechanism</i>	<i>SDM</i>
MDP	Mécanisme de Développement propre	<i>Clean Development Mechanism</i>	<i>CDM</i>
MIV	Mécanisme International de Varsovie sur les Pertes et Préjudices	<i>Warsaw International Mechanism on loss and damages</i>	<i>WIM</i>
MPD	Modalités, Procédures et Directives (ou lignes directrices – MPL)	<i>Modalities, Procedures and Guidelines</i>	<i>MPG</i>
MTD	Meilleure technologie disponible	<i>Best possible technology</i>	<i>BPT</i>
NMM	Nouveau Mécanisme de Marché	<i>New Market Mechanism</i>	<i>NMM</i>
OCDE	Organisation de Coopération et de Développement économiques	<i>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</i>	<i>OECD</i>
ODD	Objectifs de Développement durable	<i>Sustainable Development Goals</i>	<i>SDG</i>
ONG	Organisation non gouvernementale	<i>Non-Governmental Organization</i>	<i>NGO</i>
ONU	Organisation des Nations unies	<i>United Nations</i>	<i>UN</i>
OS	Organe subsidiaire	<i>Subsidiary Body</i>	<i>SB</i>
OSCST	Organe subsidiaire de Conseil scientifique et technologique	<i>Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advise</i>	<i>SBSTA</i>
OSMOE	Organe subsidiaire de Mise en Œuvre	<i>Subsidiary Body for Implementation</i>	<i>SBI</i>
PEID	Petits États insulaires en développement	<i>Small Island Developing States</i>	<i>SIDS</i>
PET	Processus d'examen technique	<i>Technical examination process</i>	<i>TEP</i>
PET-AD	Processus d'Examen Technique sur l'Adaptation	<i>Technical examination process on Adaptation</i>	<i>TEP-A</i>
PK	Protocole de Kyoto	<i>Kyoto Protocol</i>	<i>KP</i>
PMA	Pays les moins avancés	<i>Least Developed Countries</i>	<i>LDC</i>
PNA	Plan National d'Adaptation	<i>National Adaptation Plan</i>	<i>NAP</i>
PNUE	Programme des Nations Unies pour l'Environnement	<i>United Nations Environment Programme</i>	<i>UNEP</i>
RATI	Résultats d'activités d'atténuation transférés au niveau international	<i>Internationally transferred mitigation outcomes</i>	<i>ITMO</i>

French		English	
RB	Rapport biennal	<i>Biennial Report</i>	<i>BR</i>
RBA	Rapport biennal actualisé	<i>Biennial Updated Report</i>	<i>BUR</i>
RBT	Rapport biennal de Transparence	<i>Transparency biennial Report</i>	<i>TBR</i>
REA 6.4	Réductions d'émissions sous couvert de l'Article 6.4	<i>Emissions Reductions under Article 6.4</i>	<i>ERA 6.4</i>
RET	Revue d'experts techniques	<i>Technical Expert Review</i>	<i>TER</i>
RIN	Rapport d'Inventaire national	<i>National Inventory Report</i>	<i>NIR</i>
UE	Union européenne	<i>European Union</i>	<i>EU</i>
UQA	Unité de quantité attribuée	<i>Assigned Amount Unit</i>	<i>AAU</i>
URCE	Unité de Réduction certifiée des émissions	<i>Certified Emission Reduction</i>	<i>CER</i>
UTCATF	Utilisation des terres, changement d'affectation des terres et foresterie	<i>Land Use, Land Use Changes and Forestry</i>	<i>LULUCF</i>

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**ENERGIES 2050** est née de la certitude que les trajectoires de développement de nos sociétés ne sont pas une fatalité. Depuis 2007 en tant que réseau informel et, depuis 2011 en tant qu'organisation non gouvernementale sans but lucratif travaillant exclusivement dans l'intérêt général, elle contribue, au niveau international auprès des Etats et des institutions mais aussi au plus près des territoires et des gouvernements locaux, des acteurs économiques publics et privés et des citoyens, à la transformation de nos sociétés, pour un avenir plus humain et solidaire. ENERGIES 2050 rassemble aujourd'hui des membres et des partenaires de plus de 70 nationalités qui mettent en œuvre des projets dans autant de pays.



ENERGIES 2050 organise ses activités selon cinq axes complémentaires :

- Réaliser des projets démonstratifs et reproductibles accompagnés d'études techniques et d'actions de recherche pour témoigner des possibles ;
- Organiser des rencontres et des conférences ou y participer afin de multiplier les occasions de partages, d'échanges et de débats ;
- Publier les résultats de recherches selon un format adapté en fonction des publics cibles afin de mutualiser et de partager les savoirs et aller au-delà des cercles restreints d'experts et des habituels cercles de diffusion ;
- Éduquer, former et renforcer les capacités pour que chacun puisse comprendre, connaître, se sentir concerné et agir ;
- Communiquer au plus grand nombre pour informer, mobiliser et fédérer les envies d'agir.

ENERGIES 2050 est engagée dans la mise en œuvre de la *Grande Transition* et intervient de manière transversale sur la systémique du développement qu'elle décline selon les axes suivants : l'écodéveloppement et le développement durable ; la lutte contre les changements climatiques ; les politiques climatiques, environnementales et énergétiques ; la recherche et l'innovation ; les villes durables ainsi que les défis et les opportunités d'agir des territoires ruraux ; les stratégies de développement bas carbone ; la transition énergétique et le développement des sources d'énergies renouvelables, de l'efficacité énergétique et de la maîtrise de la demande en énergie ; le tourisme responsable et soutenable ; le bâtiment et le secteur de la construction ; les ressources naturelles et les biens communs de l'humanité tels que la biodiversité, l'eau et l'agriculture ; l'économie de l'écologie et de l'environnement ; les dynamiques entrepreneuriales responsables et la performance des entreprises ; le genre ; l'éducation à l'environnement ; l'économie circulaire, les dynamiques sociales et solidaires ; les changements de comportement et l'action citoyenne sous toutes ses formes d'expression, qu'elles soient artistiques ou appliquées dans des actions quotidiennes de changement de comportement.

ENERGIES 2050 est un acteur reconnu des négociations sur les changements climatiques ainsi que dans l'élaboration et la mise en place de stratégies et programmes d'actions bas carbone. ENERGIES 2050 est également connue pour la mise en place réussie de projets concrets à fort potentiel d'innovation dans les domaines de l'adaptation et de l'atténuation et dans le déploiement de programmes de renforcement de capacité indispensables pour accompagner l'appropriation et renforcer l'excellence nationale et celle des acteurs concernés. ENERGIES 2050 a notamment accompagné plusieurs pays africains pour l'élaboration de leurs Contributions Prévue Déterminées au niveau National (CPDN), la révision de leurs CDN et dans l'élaboration de dossiers préparatoires pour la soumission au Fonds Vert pour le Climat. L'association a également lancé en 2012, ethiCarbon® un outil carbone qui a pour objet de contribuer à une véritable transition écologique citoyenne et solidaire. ENERGIES 2050 est en train de déployer des structures nationales et régionales à travers le monde pour être au plus près des réalités territoriales et pouvoir répondre de manière encore plus pertinente aux besoins des acteurs sur le terrain.

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The *Institut de la Francophonie pour le développement durable (IFDD - Institute of the French-speaking world for Sustainable Development)* is a subsidiary body of the *Organisation internationale de la Francophonie* (OIF – International Organisation of the Francophonie) and its headquarters are in Quebec City.

Under its original name of *Institut de l'Énergie des Pays ayant en commun l'usage du Français* (IEPF – Energy Institute for Countries with French as a common language), the IFDD came into being in 1988 following the 11th Summit of the Francophonie held in Quebec in 1987. It was created in the wake of the global energy crises and from a desire of Heads of State and Government for cooperative action to develop the energy sector in member countries. In 1996, the Institute took the resolutions of the Rio Earth Summit 1992 as the major guide for its action and became the *Institut de l'énergie et de l'environnement de la Francophonie* (Energy and Environment Institute of the French-speaking World) And in 2013, following the Rio+20 Conference, it was renamed *Institut de la Francophonie pour le développement durable* (IFDD - Institute of the French-speaking world for Sustainable Development).

Its mission is to contribute to:

- training and capacity-building in sustainable development of various categories of development players in French-speaking countries in the energy and environment sectors;
- support for development players in initiatives to prepare and implement sustainable development programmes;
- the promotion of the sustainable development approach in French-speaking countries;
- the development of partnerships in the various economic and social development sectors, mainly environment and energy, for sustainable development.

IFDD action falls under the Strategic Framework of the Francophonie, within mission D “Sustainable development, economy and solidarity” and Strategic Objective 7 “Contribute to the preparation and implementation of the post-2015 development programme and sustainable development goals”.

The Institute is lead partner in the following three programmes under the OIF 2019-2022 schedule, implemented in partnership with other OIF units:

- Support in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals,
- Access to sustainable energy,
- Support for structural environmental transformations.

The International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF) is an institution founded on sharing a language - French - and common values. It currently groups 88 States and governments, including 54 Members, seven associate members and 27 observers. The 2018 Report on the French language worldwide sets the number of French speakers at 300 million.

The OIF carries out political and cooperation actions on all five continents in the following priority areas: French language and cultural and linguistic diversity; peace, democracy and human rights; education and training; sustainable development and solidarity. OIF pays special attention in all its actions to young people and women and to access to information and communication technologies.

The Secretary General runs the political action of the Francophonie as its international spokesman and official representative.

#### **61 member States and governments**

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#### **27 observers**

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# Éclairages sur des enjeux prioritaires

**ÉCLAIRAGES SUR DES ENJEUX PRIORITAIRES**  
4

## L'adaptation dans le cadre de l'Accord de Paris – avancées à l'issue de la Cdp24 de Katowice



**COP24-KATOWICE 2018**

CONFÉRENCE DES NATIONS UNIES SUR LE CLIMAT

Les notes Éclairages sur des enjeux prioritaires, réalisées par l'Institut de la Francophonie pour le développement durable (IFDD), visent à mettre à la disposition des acteurs francophones (gouvernements, décideurs...) des informations pertinentes sur les enjeux des négociations internationales sur le climat et la mise en œuvre de l'Accord de Paris.

La présente note, rédigée à l'issue de la 24<sup>e</sup> session de la Conférence des Nations Unies sur le climat (COP24), fournit des informations et des illustrations sur le plan de l'adaptation aux changements climatiques dans l'Accord de Paris et sa mise en œuvre, et les perspectives pour les parties prenantes.

**Historique**

La Conférence de Paris 2015 a constitué un tournant historique de la Convention sur les changements climatiques avec une modification aux protocoles des gouvernements (sommaire de 150 chefs d'État), des collectivités territoriales, de la société civile et du secteur privé («Accord-cadre à l'issue de la conférence fait comme objectif de maintenir l'augmentation de la température mondiale «verrouillée en dessous» de 2 °C d'ici 2100 par rapport aux niveaux préindustriels et de poursuivre les efforts en vue de limiter cette augmentation à 1,5 °C, comme le reflètent les pays les plus vulnérables aux changements climatiques.







**ÉCLAIRAGES SUR DES ENJEUX PRIORITAIRES**  
5

## Décryptage des règles d'opérationnalisation (Rulebook) de l'Accord de Paris issues de la Cdp24



**COP24 KATOWICE 2018**

CONFÉRENCE DES NATIONS UNIES SUR LE CLIMAT

Les notes Éclairages sur des enjeux prioritaires, réalisées par l'Institut de la Francophonie pour le développement durable (IFDD), visent à mettre à la disposition des acteurs francophones (gouvernements, décideurs...) des informations pertinentes sur les enjeux des négociations internationales sur le climat et la mise en œuvre de l'Accord de Paris.

**Contexte**

La 24<sup>ème</sup> Conférence des Parties (COP24) à la Convention Cadre des Nations Unies sur les changements climatiques (CCNUCC) et le troisième partie de la première session de la Conférence des Parties agissant comme Réunion des Parties à l'Accord de Paris (CMA.1.3) ont vu se dérouler en parallèle à Katowice (Pologne) en décembre 2018. Moment important dans l'histoire des négociations, elle a permis l'opérationnalisation de l'Accord de Paris ou, en termes simples, de son «Rulebook».

La présente note vise à décrypter ce manuel d'opérationnalisation ainsi que les limites et principaux points en suspens, qui seront notamment à l'ordre des négociations lors de la CP25 ou CH5 en décembre 2019.

La présente note, rédigée à l'issue de la 24<sup>e</sup> session de la Conférence des Nations Unies sur le climat (COP24), fournit des informations et des illustrations sur les règles d'opérationnalisation (Rulebook) de l'Accord de Paris, adoptées à Katowice à la COP24.






**ÉCLAIRAGES SUR DES ENJEUX PRIORITAIRES**  
6

## L'état des négociations sur l'article 6 de l'Accord de Paris en préparation de la Cdp25



**COP25**

CONFÉRENCE DES NATIONS UNIES SUR LE CLIMAT

Les notes Éclairages sur des enjeux prioritaires, réalisées par l'Institut de la Francophonie pour le développement durable (IFDD), visent à mettre à la disposition des acteurs francophones (gouvernements, décideurs...) des informations pertinentes sur les enjeux des négociations internationales sur le climat et la mise en œuvre de l'Accord de Paris.

La présente note fournit des informations sur l'état des négociations sur l'article 6 de l'Accord de Paris sur le climat concernant des mécanismes de coopération entre les Parties en matière d'atténuation.

**Le contexte général des mécanismes article 6**

L'Accord de Paris (AP) permet aux Parties de «coopérer volontairement» dans la mise en œuvre de leur CDN afin de relever le niveau d'ambition des mesures d'atténuation ainsi que des mesures d'adaptation. C'est particulièrement important dans le contexte de la réunion des CMA prévue jusqu'à 2020. Les formes de coopération incluent des démarches fondées sur le marché (Art.6.2 et Art.6.4) et des démarches hors-marché (Art.6.6).

Les démarches concertées établies en vertu de l'article 6.2 offrent un accès la possibilité de coopérer de manière volontaire à la mise en œuvre d'activités d'atténuation avec des résultats d'atténuation transférables au niveau international (MATT ou ITMO selon le jargon anglais), tout en promouvant le développement durable et l'intégrité environnementale. La transaction des MATT sur la base des activités d'atténuation aura lieu dans le cadre d'un système de comptabilisation à définir, qui doit garantir le respect des dispositions du cadre de transparence (Art.13). Les négociations portent sur l'élaboration de lignes directrices sur les démarches concertées.

Le mécanisme de l'article 6.4 est censé contribuer aux efforts d'atténuation et soutenir le développement durable, aboutissant à des réductions d'émissions concertées sous la supervision de la CCNUCC. Les réductions d'émissions doivent être réelles, mesurables et à long terme. La décision accompagnant l'adoption de l'AP recommande aussi le respect du principe d'additionnalité dans le développement des règles, modalités et procédures du mécanisme, et fait sur les expériences avec les mécanismes de Protocole de Kyoto. Le mécanisme vise à atténuer globalement les émissions et à éviter le double comptage, car tous les pays ont des émissions des contributions en matière d'atténuation dans le cadre de leur CDN. Les négociations portent sur l'élaboration de règles, modalités et procédures de mécanisme.




IFDD has published three «Notes techniques ÉCLAIRAGES SUR DES ENJEUX PRIORITAIRES des négociations sur les changements climatiques» in 2019.



This *Summary for Policymakers* accompanies the *Guide to the Negotiations* produced every year by IFDD as support for the sessions of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). To assist negotiators in understanding better the challenges of the 25th session of the COP (COP25), this analyses firstly the climate package adopted at the end of COP24 (December 2018, Katowice), progress at the intersession in Bonn in June 2019 and the various negotiating points left hanging.

The major issues on the COP25 negotiating Agenda are then dealt with point by point, with special attention paid to the cooperation mechanisms covered by Article 7 of the Paris Agreement. Questions relating to nationally-determined contributions (NDC), adaptation and financing, modalities, procedures and guidance of the enhanced transparency framework, questions of support for building up capacities and technology, loss and damage, gender and gender equality, agriculture and the essential involvement of non-Party entities are also dealt with.

This guide has benefited from inputs from a group of authors and contributors from different French-speaking countries who have been involved in the climate negotiations for many years. A Review Committee made up of personalities has also been set up. The format of the Guide has been streamlined compared with previous editions in order to offer every individual - negotiator or representative of the academic world, public or private organisations, civil society organisations or international institutions - access to the information he needs to comprehend the negotiations

We are hopeful that the various contributions will meet the expectations of our readers.



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